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INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF
LEGAL RIGHTS
ALFRED DENNIS MATHEWSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
All is not right in the world of intercollegiate athletics. Thousands
of young men and women, primarily between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-four, participate in public exhibitions of athletic contests on behalf of the universities and colleges in which they matriculate. All revenues derived from the staging of these exhibitions, including gate receipts and proceeds from the sale of television rights, are retained by
the universities and the associations formed by them to regulate such
exhibitions. The students may participate only if they receive no share
of these revenues or accept compensation, except for scholarships and
other permissible but nominal amounts.' Furthermore, they may not
accept compensation or pecuniary reward from any source for their
athletic skill.2
The nomenclature for this system, in which all persons collaborating in the production, sale, and delivery of athletic contests to the public, except the athletes, share in the immediate commercial rewards
generated, is "amateurism." Amateur intercollegiate athletics as such
is mandated neither by natural law nor the legislative enactment of
state legislatures or Congress. Rather, the prohibition against the sharing of the spoils with athletes, as well as other matters relating to
player eligibility, for whom students may play and the consequences of
violations, are established by agreements3 among universities and col* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. The University of
New Mexico Law Alumni Association funded the research for this article. I wish to
express my appreciation to Burton Brody, Homer Clark, Linda Greene, and Fred Hart
for their comments on drafts of this Article. I also would like to gratefully acknowledge
Kelly Champagne, Christine Lale, Rose Little, Lorraine Montoya, and Donovan Roberts for their research assistance and Sabra Dreyer who waged a holy war against the
university VAX system to complete this Article. Earlier versions of this Article were
presented in faculty colloquia at the University of Colorado and the University of New
Mexico.
1. NCAA CONST. art. 3-1(a).
2. Id.
3. Although the term "agreements" necessarily includes voluntary arrangements
among parties reached through bargaining and commonly designated as contracts, I
use the term broadly. Colleges and universities voluntarily associate with each other to
organize and produce intercollegiate athletics. Because the number of colleges involved
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leges. Through these agreements, which I call "first-tier" agreements,

universities and colleges form associations to govern intercollegiate athletics and establish the terms and conditions by which the members will
produce, sell, and deliver exhibitions to the public. The principal governing association in the United States and the subject of much discussion in this Article is the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA).
Student athletes, the ultimate subjects of a vast number of the
terms and conditions of first-tier agreements, are not members of these
associations or otherwise parties to such agreements. Instead, student
athletes enter into what I refer to as "second-tier" agreements directly
with universities, which by their own terms are subject to first-tier
agreements." Saddled with terms and conditions of first-tier agreements
that they believe are unfair, more and more student athletes are redressing adverse university or governing association actions in the
courts. These forays into the judiciary have been largely unsuccessful.

essentially precludes individual bargaining in many cases, the terms and conditions of
their association together - or agreements - to accomplish this purpose must be established through other means. The law of nonprofit associations deems the relationship
among all colleges and universities so associated as implicitly contractual, the terms
and conditions of which are contained in the articles of association or constitution,
bylaws, and resolutions, rules, and regulations approved in accordance with procedures
provided in the governing instruments or state statutes. See California State Univ.,
Hayward v. NCAA, 121 Cal. Ct. Rptr. 85 (Cal. App. 1975). These terms are not
generally bargained for. They may be accepted by a university upon becoming associated. The university may agree to be bound by such other terms as are approved
through the normative associational democracy even though it opposes a particular
term. To the extent that universities merely accept internal rules of governance without
bargaining and are subject to and benefit from statutory and case law rules governing
the relationship, the agreements among them would appear to encompass terms obtained through means beyond common notions of contract. Such rules, regardless of the
source, not only serve as gap-filler provisions but also place constraints on the permissible terms upon which members may associate, thereby enhancing fairness in dealings
among members and reducing the potential for oppression that might result due to
differences in bargaining power and transaction costs. Thus, when I refer to the agreements among universities, I am including the acceptance of the application of legal
rules provided under the law of voluntary associations.
There is currently some debate over the related question of whether the relationship among shareholders in a business corporation is entirely contractual. See Clark,
Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, HARV. Bus. SCH. RES. COLLOQ. (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986);
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Jensen
& Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
4. Second-tier agreements include the provision of national and conference letters
of intent, scholarships, grants-in-aid instruments, and all other commitments made to a
student athlete orally or in writing whether or not duly authorized by the university.
See Begley v. Corporation of Mercer Univ., 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
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Over the years, several commentators have railed against the treatment
of student athletes in intercollegiate, athletics and cried for more legal
accountability on the part of the NCAA with respect to its regulation
of student athletes.' Although the nature and scope of the advocated
accountability remains unclear, implicit in their cries for accountability
through the judicial system is the existence of enforceable private legal
rights for student athletes.
This Article arose out of my curiosity about the precise assignment
of legal rights6 among colleges and students in the production, sale, and
delivery of intercollegiate athletics. What rights might student athletes
possess that give rise to legal accountability? Although a system that
permits universities, coaches, concessionaires, television networks, and
advertisers to reap the wealth sown by student athletes while precluding the latter from contemporaneous enjoyment of pecuniary profit
seems patently unfair, my review of the cases uncovered a legal order
that does not assign legal rights to student athletes consistent with my
view.
I must confess that my curiosity about the assignment of legal
rights arose after my research began. I originally contemplated writing
an article that provided a blueprint for the liberation of student athletes from the exploitation of the NCAA and its member institutions.
In many respects, I have succeeded with the latter objective, but the
discoveries I made on my expedition through the cases have resulted in
a far less cynical -

indeed, a somewhat optimistic -

view of the fu-

ture of intercollegiate athletics in America.
To examine the assignment of legal rights between universities in
intercollegiate athletics, I reviewed more than forty reported cases in
which a student sued a university or governing association or a university sued a governing association in connection with its intercollegiate
athletics program. Each case was examined for several factual variables: (1) university, (2) student, (3) governing association or university rule violated, (4) sport, (5) legal grounds on which the actions of a
university or governing association were challenged, (6) legal relief or
remedy sought, (7) disposition at trial level involving the procedural
matter or determination of merits, (8) state or federal court, and (9)
who won.

Studying the cases for these variables was very revealing. Perhaps
5. See Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101 (1984); Note, Compensationfor Collegiate Athletes: A
Run for More Than the Roses, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701 (1985); Koch, A Troubled
Cartel: The NCAA, 38 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (1973); Weistart, Legal Accountability and the NCAA, 10 J. C. & U. L. 167 (1983); Yasser, The Black Athletes'
Equal Protection Case Against the NCAA's New Academic Standards, 19 GONz. L.
REV. 83 (1983-84).
6. See Part I of text, infra, for further discussion of the nature of legal rights.
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the most startling observation was that students and universities rarely
asked the courts to mandate systemic reform. Although the majority of
cases concern the so-called revenue producing sports of football and
basketball, other sports such as hockey, soccer, and tennis generated a
significant number of cases. Regardless of the sport involved, the most
frequently sought remedy was the right to participate as students or
their university surrogates asked the court to enjoin the university or
governing association from restricting their right to participate in intercollegiate competition. Several plaintiffs sought damages, but no case
was found in which an athlete claiming that he or she was underpaid
asked for quantum meruit damages for the fair market value of services rendered less the scholarship. The most common measure of damages identified in the cases was the speculative compensation lost at the
professional level.
The cases confirmed my long held suspicion that there is not a
unique body of sports law, and that the legal rules applicable to intercollegiate athletics, and sports in general, developed through the application of legal rules from established bodies of law. In each case the
student athlete, or a university on his or her behalf, urged the court
that the student possessed private legal rights under principles of an
established body of law under which the NCAA or the university could
be held accountable in a court of law. They argued that these principles applied to defined strings of events that occurred in the context of
intercollegiate athletics. Thus, the plaintiffs advanced causes of action
arising under the fourteenth amendment, federal or state antitrust
laws, contract law, tort law, worker's compensation laws, federal statutes such as Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,7 and
other similar laws.
A classic example is Hawkins v. NCAA. 8 In Hawkins, the NCAA
imposed penalties on the Bradley University basketball program for infractions that occurred prior to the participation of the then current
team members. The team members challenged the imposition of such
penalties on the grounds that the penalties punished innocent parties in
violation of their fourteenth amendment rights, violated antitrust law,
and constituted tortious interference with their contractual rights.
The NCAA typically defends against these types of claims with
arguments that its actions are shielded from judicial review under the
law of voluntary associations, that the technical requirements of the
cause of action have not been satisfied, or that a legal principle within
the body of law upon which the athlete's claim is based exempts the
NCAA from the claim. For example, the NCAA argued in Hawkins
that it was not a state actor, that the student athletes were not deprived

7. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)).
8. 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. IM.1987).
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of a liberty or property interest, that due process was provided, that no
suspect class was involved, that the appropriate standard of review was
the "rational basis" standard, and similar defenses.9
My journey took a decided twist upon observing student athletes in
case after case asking the courts to award participation rights 0 as a
remedy to their grievances. Why did student athletes want to participate in a system that so obviously exploited them? While I pondered
this mystery, I read Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm.1 1
Cheung reminded me of the fundamental economic proposition that
people enter into an exchange because they perceive that they will gain
from the transaction. Student athletes thus evaluate entry into the system of intercollegiate athletics relative to their other options. The contribution of Cheung's work to my analysis was not that it solved a mystery for me but that it inspired me to view the university and student as
collaborators in the production, sale, and delivery of intercollegiate athletic competition to the public. This viewpoint led me to conclude that
the principal legal rights assigned under current American law to collaborators in intercollegiate athletics relate to the right to associate.
In this Article, I detail student athletes' searches for legal rights to
protect them in direct relationships with their universities and indirect
relationships with the governing associations of which those universities
are members. Part I of this Article identifies the assignment of legal
rights among university and student collaborators involved in intercollegiate athletic competition under existing case law. I report that student
athletes, universities, and governing associations are principally assigned the right to associate voluntarily, whatever rights that they mutually agree upon in binding contracts, and the right to refuse to associate. Part II discusses attempts of student athletes to find private legal
rights under due process, equal protection, antitrust, and contract principles. I demonstrate that lawyers have argued that the strings of
events resulting from the relationships among collaborators in the production, sale, and delivery of intercollegiate athletic competition are
identical to the strings of events to which legal principles in those four
legal regimes apply. Part III shows that transaction costs severely con9. Id. at 605.

10. Typically, a student has been declared ineligible for membership on an athletic team and seeks to have his membership restored. See, e.g., NCAA v. Gillard, 352
So. 2d 1072 (Miss. 1977). Sometimes only a part of his right to participate as a member of the team is affected. For example, in Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of
Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972), the players were suspended from playing in games but were permitted to continue to participate in prac-

tices for the remainder of the season. When the Big Ten Conference decided they were

ineligible to participate in practices as well, the student athletes sued. Likewise, in
Hawkins v. NCAA, the student athlete maintained that NCAA action denied him full
participation, which included appearances on television and in post-season play.
11. 26 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1983).
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strain bargaining among student athletes and universities at the point
of formation of second-tier relationships and that such bargaining does
not occur until the right to participate is jeopardized because of the
inherent nature of its value and the differences in that value over time.
I conclude this Part by demonstrating that the consequence of the combination of constrained bargaining and the allocation of legal rights,
without regard to the constraints of transaction costs, is industry inefficiency that is reflected in the existence of two fundamental structural
deficiencies in the governance of the collaborative arrangements among
student athletes and universities. First, student athletes have no real
opportunity to influence substantive first-tier terms. Second, and more
important, student athletes are not able to obtain accountability on the
part of universities through bargaining.
Part IV proposes to remedy structural deficiencies in the legal relationships among student athletes and university collaborators by developing common law rules governing their unique relationships or
through the promulgation of an intercollegiate athletics code that
would assign legal rights among the various collaborators in a fashion
similar to general business corporation codes.
This article principally addresses issues in men's athletics because
the vast majority of collegiate cases involve men's athletics. Nevertheless, the issues discussed are equally applicable to women's athletics. I
have chosen to use the masculine pronoun as gender neutral. This Article does not address issues relating to equality between men's and
women's athletic programs. Nor does this Article directly cover the legal relationships among member universities or between a university
and its coaches.

II.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF LEGAL RIGHTS TO ASSOCIATE AND NOT TO
ASSOCIATE

The Coase Theorem, as commonly articulated, rests upon the premise that a legal order somehow assigns legal rights or entitlements to
those persons who are subject to that legal order.12 I have always found
this fundamental premise as intriguing as the relationship of transaction costs and legal rights to economic efficiency. How are legal rights
assigned? By whom and to whom are they assigned? And what are
legal rights anyway? I suppose the latter is the most interesting of the
three questions, for law students learn early in their study of the law
that legal rules, whether rooted in common law or promulgated by legislatures, establish the benefits or burdens that society will confer, exact, or impose on people as they interact with one another. Thus, legal
rights are assigned to persons through legal rules by legal rulemakers,
12. Coase actually wrote of the establishment of a delimitation of rights. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. EcON. 1, 8 (1960).
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i.e., courts and legislatures. When a legal rule confers benefits and imposes burdens -

and a legal rule necessarily accomplishes both -

it

may be said to effectuate an assignment of legal rights to those persons
affected by it. However, Coase appears to have been concerned only
with the right to control or influence the allocation of resources under
certain circumstances in preference to others.1" In this section, I shall
discuss the specific delimitation of legal rights among universities, governing associations, and student athletes and how those rights establish

the right to control or influence the allocation of resources in the industry of intercollegiate athletics.
The assignment of legal rights among collaborators involved in the
production, sale, and delivery of intercollegiate athletic competition to

the public flows from the confluence of three sets of similar legal rules,
respectively applicable to three distinct factual contexts in which the
courts have historically abstained from resolving disputes. These con-

texts are (a) sports,' (b) the relationship between students and the
university 5 and (c) voluntary associations. 6 In cases involving each of
these contexts separately, courts have articulated rules requiring judicial restraint except to the extent necessary to enforce legally binding

agreements made by the parties, including, but not limited to, any implied contractual rights arising under the law of voluntary nonprofit

associations. 7 When these contexts are combined in the intercollegiate
athletics setting, the courts will honor rights obtained under the terms
of legally binding agreements reached or accepted by the collaborators,
but will not dictate terms upon colleges, universities, and students stag13. Coase wrote, "But it has to be remembered that the immediate question
faced by the courts is not what shall be done by whom but who has the legal right to do
what." Coase, supra note 12, at 15 (emphasis in original).
14. In National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club
of Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920), affid, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), the court
stated:
If a game'of baseball, before a concourse of people who pay for the privilege
of witnessing it, is trade or commerce, then the college teams, who play
football where an admission fee is charged, engage in an act of trade or
commerce. But the act is not trade or commerce; it is sport.
Id. at 685; see Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977);
Nelson, Introduction: Bringing Sports Under Legal Control, 10 CONN. L. REV. 251
(1978); Zuckman, Throw 'Em to the Lions (Or Bengals): The Decline and Fall of
Sports Civilization As Seen Through the Eyes of a United States District Court, 5 J.
C. & U. L. 55 (1977).
15. Greene v. Howard University, 217 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), cause remanded by 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8 J. C. & U.
L. 141 (1981-82).
16. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA,
417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976); Note, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930).
17. See supra note 3.
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ing sports contests."'
Whether the relationships among collaborators arise out of individual contracts or out of membership in voluntary unincorporated associations, legal rights are assigned based upon the association of collaborators with each other. The collaborators obtain the basic right to
associate voluntarily with any other collaborators who are willing to
associate with them, as well as other legal rights that might be obtained through the exercise of that right.19 Implicit in the right to associate, and equally important, is the right to refuse to associate. The
exercise of this right is the principal sanction used by governing associations in intercollegiate athletics.2 0

18. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988); NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.
1977).
19. I frame the assignment in terms of the right to associate because more than
freedom to contract is involved. "Contract" connotes a legally binding agreement and,
as I wrote in note 3 and the text accompanying notes 15 and 16, those agreements
include implied contracts and legal rules under voluntary associations law. Furthermore, I demonstrate in this Article, that many of the agreements reached between
student athletes and the university are not legally binding. Contract is but one form of
association. Although the student's associational relationship with his university may be
contractual, his relationship with the NCAA, other universities, teammates, and players on other teams is not. In fact, viewing the relationship between a student athlete
and his university may be misplaced. The fiction of the university as a body corporate
is a modern convenience. A university is a setting in which students are provided an
opportunity to obtain higher education. Although the various constituent participants
at a university have sets of expectations that they hope to fulfill in the setting, none of
those participants have the right to compel other individuals to deliver those specific
expectations. Most of the cases involve attempts by a participant to remain in a setting
rather than to compel the performance of an obligation or delivery of those
expectations.
Thus, it is more appropriate to look at the association of student athletes and universities as collaborators. In at least one case the issue has been framed in terms of the
student athlete's freedom to associate. In Karmanos v. Baker, 617 F. Supp. 809, 816
(E.D. Mich. 1985), afl'd, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987), the student athlete claimed
that the NCAA punished him for associating with professional hockey players in Canada. The court rejected the claim, explaining that the NCAA had merely barred him
playing intercollegiate ice hockey with an NCAA affiliated college or university, and
had not barred him from otherwise associating with a member university or other participants. My point is that the NCAA, and the member university involved pursuant to
its first-tier agreement, exercised their right to refuse to associate with him in the production, sale, and delivery of intercollegiate hockey to the public.
20. A university ordinarily has the right to refuse to admit a person as a student
who does not meet its academic standards. It may terminate its relationship with students who fail to perform satisfactorily in their studies. Under the existing system of
intercollegiate athletics, a university must refuse to permit a student to participate in
intercollegiate athletics who does not meet certain academic standards or who accepts
or has accepted compensation for his or her athletic skill. A university that does not
approve of the rules of a governing association may withdraw from the association.
Likewise, a student who believes the terms on which the university will permit him to
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The Sports Context

Historically, the judiciary has not deemed disputes related to the
staging or playing of sports contests worthy of judicial consideration.
This attitude is exemplified in Federal Baseball Club v. National
League. 1 The Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore sued the National
and American Leagues after they permitted some teams from the Federal League to buy franchises but refused to permit the Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore to buy the Saint Louis Browns franchise.22 The
Federal Baseball Club asserted that the refusal violated federal antitrust laws. The applicability of the antitrust laws depended upon
whether professional baseball exhibitions constituted interstate
commerce.
The Federal Baseball Club argued that professional baseball
teams did engage in commerce because they sold a product to the public who attended the games, traveled across state lines to play games,
and purchased the services of players to produce the exhibitions. 3 Justice Holmes rejected the Club's contention because the playing of a
baseball game before paying fans "although made for money would not
be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words." 2 ' He remained unpersuaded that baseball exhibitions were
products. The distinguishing characteristic, according to Justice
Holmes, that set professional baseball exhibitions apart from commerce
was that it involved "personal effort not related to production."2 5
At the heart of this dispute over the characterization of professional baseball were the implications for associational rights. If professional baseball was merely sport, then the federal courts would not intervene and the Federal Baseball Club possessed only those rights
obtained through its voluntary association with the National League.
And it had no such agreement. Although the Federal Baseball Club
might have been willing to associate with the National or American
League, without judicial intervention the leagues were free to exercise
participate in intercollegiate athletics are exploitative may refuse to participate. The
exercise of the right to refuse to associate, unfettered by judicial intervention, is perhaps the most powerful.legal right assigned to members of governing associations. It is
the principal means through which governing associations enforce their rules.
21. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
22. The Leagues were sued for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. According to Justice Holmes, the Leagues either bought out or induced all Federal League franchises to abandon the Federal League except the Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore. 259 U.S. at 207. For a detailed history of collective bargaining in
organized clubs, see Berry & Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining:Of
Players, Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 685, 686 (1981).
23. 259 U.S. at 202-03.
24. Id. at 209.
25. Id.
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their right to refuse to associate.2 6 Accordingly, what the Federal Baseball Club sought were legal restrictions on the right of the National
and American Leagues to refuse to associate with it or at least restrictions on the right of those Leagues to require players to refuse to associate with it.2 7 It offered the federal antitrust laws as a set of legal
rules that placed restrictions on basic associational rights, including the
right to refuse to associate, in commercial dealings.
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. 28 the Supreme Court acknowledged that professional baseball was commerce, but declined to
reverse Federal Baseball Club or reach a result inconsistent with it
insofar as baseball was concerned. The Supreme Court has subsequently followed its reasoning in Toolson and has applied the federal
antitrust laws to all other professional sports that have come before it.2 9
In 1984, the Court followed the reasoning in Toolson when it ruled
that federal antitrust laws applied to the regulation of broadcast rights
in intercollegiate athletics.3 0 Although these cases provide little consolation to the Federal Baseball Club, they show a retreat from Justice
Holmes' approach and stand squarely for the proposition that associational rights among sports collaborators may be restricted under federal antitrust laws.
As implied by Justice Holmes' statements, a substantial justification for the hands-off approach is that people voluntarily associate in
sports for fun. It is leisure activity, participated in as a player or a fan
for its impact on the psyche and one's general well-being. This justification was also well articulated by the trial court in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.s1 In the absence of professional sports, such participation ordinarily would not result in any direct addition to or
subtraction from one's tangible wealth.
Another justification was articulated by Justice White and joined
by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in the NCAA television case.32 The
participants must agree on some matters related to the playing of the

26.

See supra note 20.

27. The alleged antitrust violations included a challenge of the "reserve system"

that bound a player to a team for his career. Arguably, a player so bound lacked the
legal right to contract with a different team regardless of the league involved.
28. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
29. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n., 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)(basketball);
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)(football); United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955)(boxing); see also Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D.
Pa. 1972)(hockey).
30. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
31. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977).
32. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 121 (White, J., dissenting)

(Justice White asserts that the NCAA establishes rules and regulations in order to
enhance higher education and does not function primarily in the pursuit of profits).
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games if they are to be played at all. The participants, among many
others, must decide on the game's rules and on how and by whom the
rules will be enforced. Certainly, the time and resources of the courts
ought not be wasted reviewing the decisions of game officials33 to
merely redistribute psychic gains.
B.

The University and Student Context

Legal rights in intercollegiate athletics are assigned not only on
the basis of sports but also on the status of the university and student.
The relationship between a university and its students is contractual in
nature with terms evidenced by the application form, catalogue, student handbooks, and university regulations. The rights obtained by students are quite limited, as the courts historically have shown great deference to the decisions of educational institutions affecting their
students. 4 The doctrine of academic abstention has been eroded somewhat in recent years, 5 but it still survives even though the related doctrine of in loco parentis, from which it derived, has become an anachronism. Under present law, the doctrine of academic abstention permits
universities as bodies corporate, subject to express constitutional and
statutory limits, to refuse to associate with students except on the terms
and conditions agreed upon by the university.
C.

The Voluntary Associations Context

Finally, one other factual variable in the intercollegiate athletic
context results in a rule that primarily assigns each party the right to
refuse to associate except on the terms it agrees upon, and concomitantly, affects the rights the party obtains through any such agreement.
Universities necessarily must associate with other universities to produce exhibitions of intercollegiate competitions. The most common
form this association takes is that of a legal entity known as a voluntary unincorporated association. 6 The members of a voluntary unincorporated association have rights provided by statute and case law, rights
33. In Georgia High School Ass'n. v. Waddell, 285 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Ga. 1981), the
parents of the players of a high school football team on the short end of the score
challenged the erroneous decision of a referee in failing to award a first down on a
"roughing the kicker" penalty late in the game. The Georgia Supreme Court went
beyond the questions appealed and held that "courts of equity in this state are without
authority to review decisions of football referees because those decisions do not present

judicial controversies."
34. See id.
35. See Kaplin, Law on the Campus 1960-1985: Years of Growth and Challenge, 12 J. C. & U. L. 269, 272-74 (1985); Greenleaf, Academic Institutions in the
Light and Shadow of the Law 12 J. C. & U. L. 1 (1985y; Nordin, supra note 15, at

145-49.
36. See supra note 3.
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provided by the governing instruments accepted by a member upon
joining, and rights provided by the resolutions and regulations adopted
in accordance with the processes afforded by the governing instruments
and applicable laws. 37 Under the noninterference doctrine, courts will
not intervene in the internal affairs or operations of a voluntary association except to enforce rights so obtained. 8 Thus, the noninterference
doctrine generally precludes a member of the association from successfully challenging an adverse determination on a student's eligibility in
court.8 9 A member university that does not like a determination or rule
or bylaw provision has a remedy; it may refuse to associate with the
governing association and its other members. The student athlete who
is precluded from membership in the governing association is apparently relegated to that same remedy if he or she finds the rules of the
governing association unacceptable.'"
D.

The Intercollegiate Athletics Context

Legal rights governing the second-tier relationship between the
student athlete and the university are such that each has the right to
associate or to refuse to associate prior to their association. They have
whatever other rights they subsequently agree upon in legally binding
agreements. The student athlete customarily agrees, as a part of those
agreements, to associate or collaborate with other universities with
whom the student's university has entered into first-tier relationships
for the production, sale, and delivery of intercollegiate athletic competitions. As the student athlete further agrees to be bound by the first-tier
agreements, the various governing associations also obtain legal
rights."
The operation of this assignment of legal rights may be demonstrated by examining four components of the second-tier relationship
between a university and a student athlete: formation, nature and quality of the right to participate, the duration of the period of collaboration and its termination, and transfers of student athletes from one university to another.
Formation occurs upon the decision of a university and a student
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., California State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Note, supra note 16, at 1001-06, 1018-20.
39. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1977).
40. Under the terms of the university's association with the governing association, all agreements it may make with student athletes are subject to the terms of the
governing association.
41. The letter of intent between a student athlete and a university usually incorporates the rules and regulations of the applicable governing associations. See, e.g.,
Begley, 367 F. Supp. at 909.
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athlete to associate together in the production of intercollegiate athletics. The agreement to associate is evidenced by a letter of intent, scholarship, or grant-in-aid, but these documents do not necessarily contain
the entire agreement between the parties."2 No university may compel
the formation of this relationship with a student athlete if the student
does not choose to do so. And in general, a student athlete may not
compel a university to associate with him or her unless it so chooses. A
university's ability to associate with a student athlete may be restricted,
however, by virtue of its first-tier agreements - the most notable being
requirements that athletes meet minimal academic entrance standards,
become a student at the university, and qualify as an amateur. Thus, a
university not only may, but must, refuse to associate with athletes
lacking these characteristics.
The nature and quality of the student athlete's right to participate
is fixed by the agreement of the parties. The student athlete ordinarily
obtains the right to participate in practice sessions, conditioning programs, games with other universities, and post-season and television appearances when merited. 3 In most cases, the student athlete receives a
scholarship in exchange for participation."" The ability of a university
to deliver some or all of the participation agreed upon may be restricted by virtue of its first-tier agreements. For example, if the university violates its first-tier agreements it may be banned from television and post-season appearances even though it promised, perhaps
only implicitly, such appearances to the student athlete.
The duration of the period of association will extend for as long as
the parties agree. But again, the period of association to which the university may agree is restricted by first-tier agreements.4 5 The university
will associate for a maximum period of five years, but the student athlete may participate for no more than four of the five years.4" Furthermore, the first-tier arrangements of the university preclude second-tier
arrangements greater than one year at a time.47 Thus, at the end of
any academic year a university may refuse to associate further with a
42. NCAA Bylaws art. 13.9, 15.
43. See Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150-51 (provision of coaching is recognized as a
benefit to students); Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at 609 (students seek to overturn ban on
post-season and television appearances); Behagen, 346 F. Supp. at 606 (students seek
to overturn suspension from participation in practice sessions and games).
44. Not all student athletes receive athletic scholarships. Some student athletes
"walk-on" to the team, and although they are not recruited by the university for the
athletic program, they make the team based upon a tryout.
45. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.2 limits a student athlete to four seasons of eligibility
over five calendar years; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.2.
47. NCAA Bylaws art. 15.3.3; see Vannelli v. NCAA, No. C3-87-2039 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 394 (1988) (court refused to find offer of four
year scholarship because university lacked authority to do so under NCAA rules).
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student athlete. Moreover, the university must terminate its association
with the student athlete if the student commits a disqualifying act or
fails to measure up to academic requirements. 8 Other member universities of the same governing association often agree to refuse to associate in intercollegiate athletics if a university does not terminate its association with a disqualified student athlete.
The student athlete is free at any time to partially or entirely
cease his association with university intercollegiate athletics. The student athlete may choose to associate with another university after ceasing his association with one university, but such a decision is discouraged by the impact of first-tier agreements on available alternatives.
First-tier arrangements permit but discourage a member university
from associating with a student athlete who previously associated with
another university. Such subsequent associations are discouraged by requiring the new university to withhold the transferred student athlete
from full participation for a period of one academic year.' 9 In addition,
the new university may not provide the transfer student athlete with
financial aid for a period of one academic year unless the original university consents." A student athlete who wishes to transfer without suffering this transfer tax must engage in the costly process of seeking
changes
in the first-tier agreements or refuse to associate.
Under
such a regime of associational rights, the persons or institutions with control or possession of resources will direct the use thereof
unless they relinquish the right through contract. Many readers, no

doubt, are familiar with the playground spectacle in which a lesser talented kid of means threatens to take his or her ball unless he or she can
play in the game. In the intercollegiate athletics context, universities
control the equivalent of the playground ball - resources. Not only are
they able to withhold the ball unless they can play, they can insist on
the right to select the other players in the game with the blessing of the
law.

It is true that universities necessarily must relinquish some of the
right to control resources through first- and second-tier agreements. As

will be demonstrated herein, universities bind themselves in first-tier
agreements in order to relinquish little control to student athletes in
second-tier agreements. The allocation of the right to control essential
resources to universities reflects the legal system's notion that universities will direct those resources into activities providing the greatest societal benefit.

48.
49.
50.

NCAA Bylaws art. 14.13.
NCAA Bylaws art. 14.6.
NCAA Bylaws art. 13.1.1.3; cf. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.6.5.1.1.
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THE SEARCH FOR RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHTS TO ASSOCIATE
AND NOT TO ASSOCIATE

No legal rule in Anglo-American jurisprudence, whether statutory
or common law based, explicitly provides for an assignment of legal
rights based upon the unique circumstances of intercollegiate athletics.
The courts apply rules that identify specific factual variables that occur
in the context of intercollegiate athletics, such as voluntary associations. The application of these rules has the effect of assigning participants only those rights that they have agreed upon in addition to the
right to refuse to associate. Accordingly, aggrieved student athletes
have been forced to search, like the Federal Baseball Club,51 for other
legal rules that identify any of the factual variables in the string of'
events occurring in the context of intercollegiate athletics: rules that
place restrictions on the permissible terms and conditions on which the
collaborators may associate or on the right to refuse to associate, rules
that limit the right of universities to direct the use of resources contrary to the interests of student athletes.
The result has been claims that a student athlete was deprived of
52
his right to participate in intercollegiate athletics without due process,
that eligibility rules were a denial of equal protection of the laws, 53 that
the actions of a university constituted a breach of contract,54 that imposition of penalties amounted to a tortious interference with contractual
rights,55 that the actions violated antitrust laws,5" and that student athletes were entitled to compensation under workmen's compensation
laws.5 7 Other types of cases have been brought but they fall into isolated categories.5 The cases generally fall into four classes corresponding to the four components of second-tier agreements described in the
51. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
52. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977);
Hawkins, 652 F.2d at 609; Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983);
NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1977).
53. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); Howard Univ. v.
NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1975); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975); Bucton v. NCAA, 366 F.
Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
54. See supra note 4.
55. Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at 602; Kupec v. Atlantic Coast Conf., 399 F. Supp.
1377 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
56. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Justice v. NCAA,
572 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
57. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind.
1983), Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
58. E.g., Butts v. NCAA, 751 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1984) (action for age discrimination); Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), afld on
reh'g, 859 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1989) (action against coach for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir.
1971), affd, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972) (actions based on first amendment).
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preceding section: Formation, Nature and Quality, Termination, and
Transfer cases. In Formation cases, the university should not have
formed or entered into a collaborative relationship with a student athlete. Typical Formation cases occur when a student does not meet academic entry standards or is no longer eligible because of participation
in a foreign country.
Nature and Quality cases are those in which a university has been
subjected to sanctions that infringe upon the nature and quality of the
student athlete's right to participate in intercollegiate athletics, such as
bans on television and post-season appearances.
In Termination cases, the university has terminated its relationship
with a student athlete and refused to further associate in intercollegiate
athletics with that student athlete. An example might be when a student has committed a disqualifying act and the NCAA or other governing association determined that the student athlete was permanently
or temporarily ineligible for athletic participation. Frequently, cases involving the termination of a relationship for failure to satisfy academic
entry standards arise only after a relationship has been formed, but for
organizational purposes those cases are included with the Formation
cases.
Transfer cases include those instances when a university has complied with first-tier restrictions on participation by a student athlete
who has transferred from another university.
The classification of the cases as Formation, Nature and Quality,
Termination, and Transfer is a necessary step in their analysis. Nonetheless, I have chosen to organize my discussion in terms of the usual
causes of action used to challenge the action of the governing association or university rather than these four categories. I shall examine the
use of due process, equal protection, antitrust, and contract-related
rules by student athletes and universities on their behalf.
A.

Due Process Claims

The fourteenth amendment makes no reference to intercollegiate
athletics; nonetheless, student athletes and universities have repeatedly
asked courts to grant remedies based upon its application to intercollegiate athletics in cases involving each of the four previously discussed
classes of cases. The student athletes argue that the specific string of
events in their cases constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, or property
by a state without due process. They argue that the NCAA is a state
actor, the student athlete's right to participate is property, and the
NCAA's determination of ineligibility is a deprivation of that property
and the process afforded to the student athlete falls short of due pro-
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cess. 59 Variations of this analysis include claims that the property interest consists of contractual rights under a scholarship grant-in-aid
agreement, 60 or intercollegiate athletics equate to education in such a
way that the property interest is the right to an education. 6 1
In many of the cases, the court finds the absence of state action
but proceeds to analyze other elements of the claim. Challenges on procedural due process grounds in these cases are understandable since all

four groups of cases involve decisions that must be rendered through
some form of process. Theoretically, however, the NCAA or other governing association may cure due process failures by reconsidering the

decision and using an appropriate process. If time and expense were not
factors,62 a court decision that due process requirements were not satisfied would provide a short-lived victory for the student athlete.
Analysis of specific due process claims reveal concerns regarding

the application of at least one of four sets of substantive first-tier provisions to student athletes. The first set of challenged first-tier provisions
is that governing the process afforded to student athletes in the enforcement stage. In Gillard v. NCAA, 6 3 a Termination case, a student athlete challenged his disqualification for a portion of the football season
on the ground that existing NCAA rules technically granted a hearing
only to the university.6 ' He had participated in the hearing through his

coach. The university, in the exercise of its rights, had also represented
the student's interests in the hearing. He apparently argued at trial
that the interests of the university were not aligned with his interests
and the university had not adequately represented him in the hearings.
Similar arguments about the lack of process were advanced in

Hawkins v. NCAA,65 a Nature and Quality case, in which Bradley

59. Most recent decisions, culminating in the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in
Tarkanian, have determined that the NCAA is not a state actor. Hall v. University of
Minnesota, 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982), is the only case of which I am aware
that held the athlete possessed a property interest in his participation.
60. Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1984); Justice, 577 F. Supp. at
356.
61. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 422 F. Supp. 1158, 1162
(Minn. 1976), rev'd, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977).
62. In several cases, the student athlete won injunctive relief in the trial court.
Although the injunction was subsequently overturned by an appellate court, such reversal did not occur until after the student's eligibility had expired in normal course. See,
e.g., NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1977).
63. Id.
64. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.13.1 obligates a university to withhold a student athlete from all intercollegiate competition as soon as he becomes ineligible. A student
athlete automatically becomes ineligible upon the occurrence of circumstances that
render him ineligible. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.14.1 confers the right to appeal the loss of
eligibility solely on the university.
65. 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. I11.1987).
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University was penalized66 for violations that had occurred in its basketball program before any of the suing team members had enrolled at
Bradley. When Bradley University declined to appeal 67 the penalties,
some team members filed suit. They claimed, among other things, that
because they would suffer under the penalties they were entitled to a
hearing that NCAA rules did not afford. Although the court determined that the due process claims failed because of a lack of state
action, it nevertheless examined the alleged denial of due process.
Relying upon Justice v. NCAA, 68 a case with nearly identical
facts, the Hawkins court concluded that only the university was entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The Justice court had
concluded that the interests of the players were adequately represented
by the University of Arizona and the only contribution the players
could have added was additional requests for leniency. 69 In examining
the adequacy of representation provided to the student athlete by Bradley University, the Hawkins court ignored Bradley's failure to appeal
the penalties. The court stated that it was sympathetic to the plight of
the student athletes but public policy favored first-tier agreements for
the production of amateur intercollegiate athletics
and second-tier
70
agreements must necessarily be subject to them.
Universities have expressed concern about their obligation to provide due process in the enforcement stage, notwithstanding first-tier
provisions. State universities in particular have argued that their obligations under first-tier agreements are subject to their constitutional
obligation to provide due process to student athletes. 71 In Regents of
the University of Minnesota v. NCAA, the university maintained that
constitutional constraints mandated that it make a factual determination through student grievance procedures as to whether the student
athletes accepted compensation in exchange for athletic skill in violation of NCAA rules.73 The Eighth Circuit, like most appellate courts
66. The NCAA rendered a public reprimand, placed Bradley on two years probation, barred the men's basketball team from post-season competition during the
1986-87 academic year, and restricted off campus recruiting for one year. Id. at 605.
67.

Id.

68. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
69. Id. at 368-69.
70. Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at 615.
71. See, e.g., Cal. State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975).
72. 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 354. NCAA Bylaws treat the occurrence of ineligibility as an objective
factual event requiring no official declaration. The rationale is essentially that a person
is pregnant or not. Nevertheless, the university is required to withhold a student who is
ineligible from participation. And a university cannot withhold a student from participation unless it is first determined that the student is ineligible. Ineligibility is not a
condition like pregnancy that can be accurately determined through medical tests, especially when violations of amateurism are concerned. Verification is frequently inexact
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that have considered this issue, recognized that upholding the position
of the university would effectively render the NCAA incapable of enforcing its rules against state universities. 7' It accepted, without so
holding, that the university was constitutionally required to provide due
process, but held that its submission of the eligibility issue to its student grievance procedures satisfied constitutional requisites.7 5 The court
implied that the university grievance tribunal acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not finding violations since the record of proceedings contained clear violations. 71 In ruling on these issues, the court seemed
more concerned about the preservation of amateur intercollegiate athletics than with the soundness of the proposition that constitutional' restraints on governmental action must give way to the commands of
first-tier agreements.
The second set of first-tier provisions are not directly challenged in
due process cases, but appear at the core of disputes between student
athletes and governing associations. These provisions, which establish
the extraordinarily narrow scope of amateurism policies and the ultimate penalty of permanent ineligibility for their violation, were at the
heart of Regents of the University of Minnesota.
The defense of the student athletes by the University of Minnesota
was unquestionably motivated by concerns about the possibility of permanent ineligibility for the student athletes who were involved in relatively minor violations of substantive NCAA rules. Under NCAA
rules, a student athlete who violates the prohibition against receiving
any compensation for performing is automatically ineligible to participate upon receipt of the compensation. The athlete's university may
obtain a waiver of all or a portion of the penalty through an appeal to
the NCAA for the restoration of eligibility. 78 Since NCAA rules do not
contain standards for waiver, a decision to restore any portion of eligi-

and based upon evidence that would be inadmissible in a court of law.
74. Specifically, NCAA Bylaws art. 14.14 authorizes an appeal to restore eligibility. Thus, no hearing or other process is afforded on the finding of ineligibility. Process is provided only after eligibility has been lost officially. The restoration of the
eligibility process is really a means through which the NCAA determines if it will
waive any portion the period of ineligibility prescribed under NCAA Bylaws. Technically, it is not a process for challenging a determination of ineligibility. Whether the
Eighth Circuit understood this flaw is not clear. The court probably realized that the
position of the University of Minnesota afforded a student athlete substantial process,
and wary of the adverse impact on amateur intercollegiate athletics, was reluctant to
hold that this much process was constitutionally required. First, the university must
give the athlete a fact finding hearing on the issue of ineligibility. Then, he or she gets
another crack if the university appeals for the restoration of eligibility.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 560 F.2d at 367-68.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 359-60.
NCAA Bylaws art. 14.14.
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bility falls entirely within the discretion of the NCAA.7 The University of Minnesota's internal disciplinary tribunal balked at the potential
imposition of a penalty that on its face was disproportionate to the offenses committed. 80
Disproportionality connotes an imbalanced scale with one weight
heavier than the other. In these cases the student athletes might have
argued that the permanent or lesser period of ineligibility outweighed
the specific violations of amateurism. The student athlete in NCAA v.
Gillard purchased a suit at a one-third discount not available to other
students, whereas the student athletes in Regents of the University of
Minnesota were accused of accepting $175 in exchange for complimentary tickets with a face value of $78 and receiving rides to and from a
summer basketball camp. Query whether the student athletes in either
of these cases should have been subjected to the loss of eligibility for
those violations? The question is not whether permanent ineligibility or
some lesser period of ineligibility is ever appropriate but whether it is
appropriate in all cases involving violations of amateurism.
There have been direct challenges to the third set of first-tier provisions, which authorize the imposition of sanctions against a university
in a manner so that the onus falls upon student athletes who did not
take part in the violations. When the NCAA bans a university from
television and post-season appearances in a particular sport, it effectively bans all student athletes who participate in that sport at that
university regardless of their culpability. Student athletes have argued
that such penalties, and the first-tier agreement provisions that prescribe their imposition, are impermissible because they violate the student athlete's fundamental right to be free from punishment absent
personal guilt.8" The student athletes based their arguments on substantive due process grounds in Justice"2 and on equal protection
grounds in Hawkins.88
In both cases, the student athletes lost their arguments based upon
technical analyses of their claims. The student athletes failed to show
the existence of the fundamental property or liberty interests required
under a substantive due process claim. The Justice court held that "the
right to participate in post-season or televised college athletic competition" did not qualify as such an interest."' Moreover, the court declined
79. See supra note 63.
80. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 560 F.2d at 359-60; see also NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1977) (student athlete was similarly motivated by a sense
that a half-season of ineligibility was disproportionate to the seriousness of his
violation).
81. Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at 612; Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 369.
82. 577 F. Supp. at 369.
83. 652 F. Supp. at 612.
84. 577 F. Supp. at 370.
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to equate NCAA enforcement actions with the type of punishment
from which innocent persons are afforded substantive due process protection. Hawkins employed a similar analysis in' rejecting the equal
protection claim. The court stated that a classification will only be subjected to strict scrutiny when a suspect class is involved
or where a
5
fundamental property or liberty interest is infringed .
The principal justification for such broad-brush, first-tier rules that
seriously and adversely affect innocent student athletes lies in a deeprooted but empirically unproven concern: universities fear that the governing associations can not enforce their rules efficaciously unless student athletes bear a significant portion of the costs of enforcement.
This fear was openly expressed by the court in Justice in response to a
suggestion that the NCAA levy fines on the universities as an alternative to television and post-season, bans. 6 The court rejected this idea,
stating that fines would have no deterrent effect on the university because it would pass along the fines to -contributors, students, and taxpayers.8 7 In other words, the universities would be worse off with fines
as sanctions in that they would be unable to enforce the rules of the
governing association even though student athletes would be better off.
The court may not have realized the irony of its conclusion. It in effect
suggested that the only way to deter misconduct by institutions of
higher learning is to make the university less attractive to prospective
student athletes by making innocent student athletes at the university
suffer.
The Justice court advanced one other justification for its result.
The very nature of playing sporting games requires that an entire team
suffer for the misconduct of a single player during the course of a
game. 8 When a football player jumps offside, the entire team is penalized rather than just the individual player. This reasoning exhibits the
same flawed reasoning employed by Justice Holmes, namely that rules
applicable to the playing of the game ought also apply to every aspect
of the staging, production, sale, and delivery of the game to the public.
The final set of first-tier provisions involve restrictions on the right
of student athletes to transfer to another university to participate in
intercollegiate athletics. These restrictions are also overly inclusive.

85. 652 F. Supp. at 613.
86. 577 F. Supp. at 372-73.
87. Id. at 373.
88. Id. at 371. The court quoted with approval Moreland v. Western Pa. Interscholastic Athletic League, 572 F.2d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 1978), as follows: "It is regrettable, however, that enforcement of the rule sanctioned upon schools for serious
breaches of the rules visits tangible deleterious effects upon certain innocent players
... . But the reality that the innocent do suffer because of the improper conduct of a
guilty few is not an unusual occurrence in the sports world; it is an inherent risk in the
rules of any game." Id.
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Designed principally to prevent raiding and preserve amateurism, 9
they reach all transfers regardless of the underlying motive. For example, in McHale v. Cornell University,9" a student athlete transferred
from the University of Maryland to Cornell University for academic
reasons. He discovered that NCAA bylaws precluded participation for
an academic year regardless of the reason for the transfer."
The student athlete in McHale resorted to procedural due process
but it is not clear whether he attacked the process by which the rule
was promulgated or the process by which the substantive rule was applied. If a student athlete in a Transfer case, or in any case involving a
first-tier provision, brings an action on procedural due process grounds,
the appropriate focus of the challenge should be on the exclusion of the
student athlete from the process that generated the substantive provision as well as the process by which the rule was applied to him. The
governing association could produce the identical rule but only after
correcting the defective process by somehow including student athletes
in the process through which the first-tier agreement was established.
These restrictions facilitate the governance of intercollegiate athletics by member institutions at the expense of the student athletes.
The restrictions are overly broad because a rigid proscription is easier
to enforce than one that provides for exceptions.. If the rule contained
exceptions, some mechanism to determine the existence of factual predicates for exemption would be necessary. Moreover, the exceptions
eventually might subsume the general rule.
Thus, the goals of the governing association are obtained, but only
by imposing a substantial, and perhaps disproportionate, share of the
costs upon the student athlete. The student athlete in McHale did not
argue that the NCAA could not place restrictions on transfers. Indeed,
he seemed to acknowledge that a rule designed to prevent the raiding
of student athletes was desirable. He objected, however, to an overinclusive rule that imposed costs on a student athlete when no raiding
occurred.
B.

Equal Protection Claims

Fourteenth amendment equal protection rules have been used by
student athletes primarily in Formation cases involving first-tier provisions establishing eligibility standards. These types of provisions readily

89. Presumably, universities with successful programs and the concomitant accoutrements would be able to lure student athletes with ease. A Notre Dame-like university need only announce that its team had openings and student athletes would beat
a path to its door. Universities would be tempted to advertise their economic
advantages.
90. 620 F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).

91.

Id. at 68; NCAA Bylaws art. 14.6.
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lend themselves to equal protection analysis because eligibility standards, by definition, must relate to personal characteristics such as
whether, for example, the athlete is an amateur, whether he or she
meets academic entry standards, or whether he or she is a student enrolled at the university.
Here student athletes used the same traditional legal analysis as
used in the due process cases. They claimed that a state actor's refusal
to permit a student athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics on
the basis of eligibility standards or other first-tier provisions that have a
disproportionate adverse affect or facially discriminate against persons
of a particular race, nationality, or other class protected as a suspect
Clause of the fourteenth
class is actionable under the Equal Protection
92
statutes.
rights
civil
and
amendment
First-tier provisions establishing uniform minimum academic standards have generated the most controversy even before the NCAA
adopted Proposition 48.93 Parish v. NCAA 94 is the leading case in
which a student athlete challenged NCAA academic standards on
equal protection grounds. Robert Parish, now of Boston Celtic fame,
argued that the NCAA's exercise of the right to refuse to associate
with him in intercollegiate athletics on the ground that he failed to
meet minimum academic standards amounted to illegal discrimination.
He apparently was unclear as to the precise nature of the discrimination, -but the court ascertained allegations of racial discrimination as
well as others. 95 Although the court agreed that a refusal to associate
because of race would be illegal, 9" Parish was unable to prove discrimination and lost.97
A victory by Parish would not necessarily have meant the demise
of academic eligibility standards, although the court almost certainly
believed it would. The decision merely would have precluded the
NCAA from establishing academic standards that it knew would exclude a discrete class of persons from participation in intercollegiate
athletics who were otherwise eligible to participate in the university's
academic program. The establishment of academic standards would
have been decentralized and relegated to member universities in the
92. Whether the lawsuit is brought under the fourteenth amendment or 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the student athlete must show the presence of state action and racial
discrimination that caused the harm.
93. Now codified at NCAA Bylaws art. 14.3 (setting minimum academic standards for admission and participation in intercollegiate athletics).
94. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
95. Id. at 1033. The court found that the student athletes suggest at least seven
suspect classes: blacks, cultural minorities, the educationally deprived, persons of less
than average intelligence, late achieving students, student athletes, and impecunious
student athletes.
96. Id. at 1033.
97. Id. at 1034.
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same manner that such standards are established for all other students.
Of course, proponents of uniform standards fear that standards set autonomously by member universities will mean the widespread use of
professional athletes disguised as students, a state of affairs bearing a
close resemblance to actual practice under the current standards determined through a centralized process.
Many equal protection challenges involve first-tier eligibility standards adversely impacting foreign student athletes. In Howard University v. NCAA, 98 a foreign student athlete was ineligible under then
NCAA Bylaw 5-l(d)-(3). " Although Howard University lost the case
on other grounds, the court struck down the bylaw because it discriminated solely on the basis of national origin. 10° The revised version10 1 of
the bylaw, which was made applicable to all student athletes, was unsuccessfully challenged in Arlosoroff v. NCAA
03

02

and Spath v.

NCAA.
The student athletes in those cases claimed that the bylaw,
although neutral on its face, was directed at foreign students.
Student athletes who previously played in the Canadian hockey
system are a fertile source of equal protection challenges to first-tier
amateur eligibility standards. In Canada, hockey at the scholastic level
is operated by pure sports organizations independent of the school systems. These organizations routinely pay room, board, and incidental
expenses to players who find it necessary to move to the urban areas
where the teams are located. The receipt of such amounts constitutes
compensation in exchange for athletic skill under NCAA rules and
players who receive such "compensation" are deemed professionals and
are ineligible for participation in NCAA governed sports. Canadians
claim the amateur eligibility standards discriminate against them on
the basis of national origin and wealth.104 Americans who participate in
Canadian hockey claim the standards discriminate on the basis of
wealth.' 05
Regardless of the discrimination alleged, the broad outlines of the
98. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
99. Under NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(d)(3), a foreign student lost one year of eligibility
for each year of organized competition in the sport after his nineteenth birthday. The
current version is codified at NCAA Bylaws art. 14.2.4.5. It does not, however, contain
any reference to nationality. "Any participation as an individual or a team representative in organized sports competition by a student during each 12-month period after the
student's 20th birthday and prior to initial full-time enrollment in a member institution
shall count as one year of varsity competition in that sport." Id.
100. Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 222.
101. See supra note 98.
102. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
103. 728 F.2d 25-(1st Cir. 1984).
104. Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976); Buckton
v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
105. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
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challenges are similar. Student athletes object to the application of
first-tier provisions that adversely affect some student athletes based
upon how they played the cards life has dealt them. Young athletes
who have spent their lives in substandard schools find that no college is
willing to give them an opportunity to prove themselves except for their
athletic skills. Poor Canadian athletes from rural communities find
they have no alternative route to opportunity other than moving to urban areas to play hockey and accepting the payment of expenses. Other
athletes find themselves in this same situation with the door to opportunity closed by first-tier provisions that forbid a member university to
open it. Had they been lucky enough to be musicians, artists, or the
children of politicians or wealthy alumni, no such first-tier provisions
would close the door.
These student athletes resort to the equal protection doctrine because of its conceptual fit and because, when applicable, it restricts the
right of universities to refuse to associate with them and others like
them in intercollegiate athletics. Yet these challenges are usually unsuccessful. The courts have uniformly held that first-tier provisions establishing academic standards, limiting participation to amateurs, and
setting limits on institutional financial aid are rationally related to legitimate objectives. 106 The most commonly discussed objectives relate
to the educational mission of member universities and the promotion of
amateurism.
C.

Antitrust Claims

Student athletes have resorted to antitrust laws in a small number
of reported cases, challenging first-tier provisions designed to establish
or preserve amateurism. Amateurism is a vague concept and, as enforced by the NCAA, hardly resembles popular connotations. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, it does not mean that student athletes may not
receive compensation under NCAA rules.
The NCAA definition of amateurism presents a three-pronged
concept. First, the NCAA fixes the amount of compensation a univer10 7
sity may give to a student athlete in exchange for athletic services.
Member universities may not remunerate student athletes pecuniarily
in excess of a scholarship and other authorized amounts in exchange
for athletic services." °8 Any amounts paid by a university not author-

106. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034, (5th Cir. 1979); Colorado Seminary
v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976).
107. Under NCAA Bylaws art. 15.01.1, "[a] student athlete may receive scholarships or educational grants-in-aid adminstered by ...

an educational institution that

do not conflict with the governing legislation of this Association." In general, permissible amounts of compensation are set forth in NCAA Bylaws art. 15.
108. NCAA Bylaws art. 15.1.
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ized by NCAA rules will be deemed unauthorized compensation re-

gardless of the purpose for which it is paid. The University cannot hire
the student athlete as either a work study student or in some other

capacity if the total amount of compensation exceeds authorized
amounts. 10 9 Second, a university may not associate in intercollegiate
athletics with a student athlete who has at any time accepted compensation for athletic skill from any source. 110 The NCAA deems many

transactions to constitute the receipt of unauthorized compensation
that the general public would not. Third, the NCAA restrains bidding
for student athletes after they have associated with a university by imposing a direct cost on student athletes who transfer from one university to another."' Thus, the NCAA concept of amateurism is exceedingly broad.
With the exception of McCormack v. NCAA," 2 however, student
athletes in reported cases have not directly objected to or advocated the
outright abolition of amateurism. McCormack directly challenged only

the first prong of the NCAA concept. The Justice court came close to
challenging the first prong but the plaintiffs implicitly accepted the validity of the NCAA concept and objected only to the sanctions used to

enforce the first prong." 8 The remaining few cases involve both the
second and third prongs.
Whichever prong of the concept is in question, the requisite string
of events under federal antitrust laws depends upon whether the action

109. NCAA Bylaws art. 15.4.5.
110. Under NCAA Bylaws art. 14.01.2, a university may not permit a student
athlete to participate in its intercollegiate athletics program unless he or she satisfies all
eligibility criteria. Under NCAA Bylaws art. 12.1.1, a student athlete loses amateur
status if the individual "uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in
any form in that sport." This bylaw provision delineates other acts that do not actually
constitute that receipt of payment but will still terminate the athlete's amateur status.
These acts include, among others, accepting a promise of pay following the completion
of intercollegiate athletics participation, signing a contract or commitment to play professionally (this restriction is limited to the specific sport because NCAA rules permit
professional status in one sport while maintaining amateur status in another), and entering into a professional draft or an agreement with an agent to negotiate a professional contract. Id. NCAA Bylaws art. 12.1.1 is supplemented by NCAA Bylaws art.
12.1.2, which specifies several transactions that constitute the "receipt of 'pay.'"
111. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.6; see supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
112. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
113. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 362. Sanctions were imposed on the university because agents and employees of the university provided extra compensation to student
athletes in violation of NCAA rules. The student athletes complained about the sanctions and not whether the penalized conduct should have resulted in sanctions. Id. In
Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990), and Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F.
Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), students who had entered the National Football League

draft or signed with an agent challenged a narrow set of second prong rules that had
resulted in the students' loss of eligibility.
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is brought under Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act."" If the action
proceeds under Section 1, the student athlete must show an agreement
or conspiracy to restrain commerce. "1 5 If under Section 2, the student

athlete must show the existence of a monopoly or an attempt to monopolize. " 6 The first-tier provisions that prescribe the three pronged amateurism policy of the NCAA are, on their face, vulnerable to antitrust
attack. Arguably, the first prong constitutes price fixing" 7 and the second and third prongs constitute a group boycott."' The NCAA frequently has been accused of being a monopolistic cartel under these
theories."'
The difficulty for the student athlete under either section lies in
the requirement that he show an injury from the antitrust violations.

This injury cannot be just any type of injury; it must be an antitrust
injury.120 Somehow, an aggrieved student athlete must demonstrate, or
at least argue, that the deprivation or infringement of participation in
intercollegiate athletics is anticompetitive as that term is used under
federal antitrust laws. 2 1 Technically, Section 4 of the Clayton Act requires an injury to "business or property" when damages are sought for

antitrust violations.

22 Thus,

the obstacle Section 4 places in the path of

the student athlete is similar to that posed by the "property" element

of the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. A similar result is obtained under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes
injunctive relief but only requires a showing of an injury cognizable in
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). A significant difference between the two is that Section I requires an agreement between at least two parties while duality is not required
under Section 2. In addition, the degree of restraint on commerce is higher in Section
2.
117. See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340, 1343-45.
118. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 375; Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. at 303;
English v. NCAA, 439 So.2d 1218, 1223-24 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
119. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), affd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. at 303; Koch, supra note 5; see also Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section I to Regulate Restraints on IntraleagueRivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219 (1984). But cf.McKenzie & Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College Athletes? An Economics and Legal
Reinterpretation,32 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 373 (Summer 1987) in which the authors

argue that the NCAA is not a cartel and does not fix wages for student athletes. They
contend that the market exists in which universities compete for the services of student
athletes and the student athletes choose among them based on the expected value of
their participation at each university.
120. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); see
also H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 373 (1985).
121. H. HOVENCAMP, supra note 120, at 374.
122. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 38
Stat. 731 (1914)).
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equity. 23
Student athletes nearly always claim, regardless of which case category is involved, that their potential earnings from a professional career have been diminished even though more than ninety-nine percent
of all student athletes do not enter the professional ranks. This claim is
premised on the axiom that any disruption in participation, training,
career development, and exposure from television and post-season appearances necessarily results in the loss of enhancement to professional
earnings. Given the minute statistical probability that a student athlete
will realize any professional earnings, the courts have viewed the injury
as being too speculative and any legal right as inchoate. 2 4 The student
athlete's interest in the value of a professional career, as of the time of
the dispute in question, has not sufficiently ripened into a business or
property interest under the antitrust laws. The athlete has obtained
nothing more than a mere expectancy interest.
The student athlete probably focuses on the expectancy interest
because he is primarily interested in obtaining continued participation
and not in the destruction of amateurism. McCormack is the only reported case in which the student athletes alleged that the injury to
property was suppressed wages at the intercollegiate level, resulting
from the absence of bidding by member universities. The focus on the
first prong of the NCAA amateurism policy in McCormack probably
occurred because the lawsuit was initiated by a disgruntled alumnus
upset with the imposition of the "death penalty" on his alma mater,
rather than by student athletes seeking participation. 2 The alumnus
also argued that the imposition of the penalty constituted a group boycott, 26 a claim also made in Justice.
Ordinarily, price-fixing and group boycotts are deemed per se violations of the antitrust laws and the occurrence of an antitrust injury is
presumed. In the case of institutional sanctions, however, the presumed
injuries from the group boycott would be incurred by the university and
not the student athlete. 12 The presumed injury resulting from price123. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988) (original version at ch. 323, § 16,
38 Stat. 737 1914)).
124. Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982), stands as
an isolated exception. The student athlete sued the university for violation of his right
to due process in rendering a decision not to continue him in its academic program. He
established a property interest in professional earnings through the use of expert testimony. The experts testified that he would be drafted in an earlier round of the National Basketball Association draft and would receive a more lucrative contract if he
participated in intercollegiate athletics for another year.
125. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1340. The "death penalty" in intercollegiate athletics results in a complete ban on the university's participation in that sport for a
specified period.
126. Id.
127. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 375 (student athletes complaining that ban on
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fixing would be suffered by the student athlete, but courts have held
that the occurrence of an antitrust injury will not be presumed in intercollegiate athletics.12 Where intercollegiate athletics are concerned,
the courts apply the rule of reason standard and engage in the factual
inquiry into the reasonableness of the restraints on commerce.12 9 Under
the rule of reason standard, student athletes must show that the anticompetitive effects of the restraints outweigh the pro-competitive
effects.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 30
the Supreme Court held that first-tier agreements governing intercollegiate athletics were not per se invalid under the antitrust laws because
joint agreements are necessary if intercollegiate athletics are to be produced at all.'
It examined first-tier television restraints and found
dominating anticompetitive effects. In passing, however, the Court volunteered that first-tier provisions regulating and maintaining amateur
athletics were pro-competitive.' 32 Similarly, the McCormack court, relying upon Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, held that
the NCAA rules establishing the first prong of the NCAA amateurism
policy were pro-competitive because "they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics."' 3 3
The finding of a dominant pro-competitive effect is more intuitive
than empirical, an exercise in the jurisprudence of the hypothetical status quo. The courts write as though the pristine state of intercollegiate
athletics that they wish existed, in fact, does exist. They write blinded
by the notion that rules designed to achieve a noble purpose do indeed
achieve that purpose. To find that such first-tier provisions are procompetitive, the courts must believe that no causal relationship exists
between the first-tier regulations of amateurism and the domination of
intercollegiate football and basketball on the playing field and in gate
receipts and television revenues by a handful of universities over the
last half century. Furthermore, the courts must. believe that such firsttier provisions bear no causal relationship to the scandals that now rock
intercollegiate athletics on a routine basis. Saying that first-tier provisions establishing amateurism are pro-competitive just does not make it
SO.

television and post-season appearances constitute group boycott against the university

by other universities).
128.

Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.; 468 U.S. at 100.

129. Id. at 103.
130.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).

131. Id. at 101.
132. Id. at 117.
133. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344 (citing Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. at 117); see also Gaines V. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn.

1990); Bank v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
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Even if the rules are anticompetitive, such first-tier provisions
would not violate antitrust laws if the organization of intercollegiate
athletics were exempt due to its nexus to the educational missions of
collaborating universities. Both Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma and McCormack refused to reach a decision on this argument by the NCAA and relied instead on the necessity of joint agreements."" Yet, the necessity of joint agreements to produce intercollegiate athletics and the concomitant analysis of anti- and pro-competitive
effects simply do not explain why price-fixing is permissible under antitrust laws at the intercollegiate level but not at the professional level.
First-tier agreements restricting bidding for athletes and fixing prices
have been evaluated under the rule of reason standard at the professional level but have been determined to be anticompetitive despite the
necessity of joint agreements. 1 5
The Supreme Court acknowledged two factors in Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma that differentiated college sports
from professional sports: the athletes in college sports are not paid and
they are college students. From an economic standpoint, it is not true
that student athletes are not compensated for the rendering of athletic
skills. 3 At a minimum, the scholarship constitutes compensation and
thus, the lack of compensation cannot be a distinguishing factor. Accordingly, the educational nexus appears the most plausible justification for any immunity that intercollegiate athletics may have from antitrust laws. Even the NCAA Bylaws recognize the educational nexus
as the principal distinguishing factor demarcating intercollegiate athletics from professional sports.' 37 I do not suggest, however, that the
educational nexus should warrant immunity from antitrust scrutiny.
Why student athletes have not brought more antitrust based challenges is open to conjecture but I propose three reasons. First, the student athlete may approve of amateurism if only in principle. He may
not desire the dismantling of the system or mind if it generally remains
intact.
Second, the immediate, paramount concern of the typical student
athlete is his own participation. He is more concerned about how the
specific substantive provisions of the first-tier agreements, their interpretation, and the actions by the governing association and the univer-

134.

Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101; McCormack, 845

F.2d at 1343-45.

135. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
136. McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 119, at 380-81.
137. NCAA Bylaws art. 12.01.2 states, "Member institutions' athletics programs
are designed to be an integral part of the educational program and the student-athlete
is considered an integral part of the student body, thus maintaining a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports."
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sity pursuant to those agreements will affect him personally. For example, the student athlete in Jones v. NCAA only challenged the policy of
amateurism to the extent that he was deemed to be a professional by
virtue of his participation in the Canadian system. 1 8 Similarly, in the
Justice case, the student athletes challenged only the sanctions that directly affected them rather than policy. If the substantive provisions
were modified as the student athletes desired in either of those cases,
they could have continued to participate or the restrictions on participation would have been removed. However, a successful antitrust challenge would endanger the entire system of amateurism. No court would
be unaware of this consequence. Student athletes may, therefore, be
reluctant to use antitrust law because they do not need the entire loaf;
they only need a slice.
Third, student athletes must overcome judicial reverence for amateurism and the proclivity of the courts to protect it from all perceived
threats. Almost every court that has been moved to comment on amateurism, regardless of the legal issues, has stated unequivocally that it
is a legitimate end. 13 9 Indeed, the court in Hawkins expressed its sympathy for the innocent student athletes but regretfully stated that the
harm they suffered in no manner outweighed the value of amateur athletics. 110 One court refused to enforce a contract between a student athlete and a professional agent on the ground that the subject matter
contravened public policy and was analogous to an illegal subject matter.14 1 Since the courts have expressed this reverence in cases in which
they thought a favorable ruling would threaten amateur intercollegiate
athletics, student athletes and their lawyers must undoubtedly perceive
a small probability of success for a direct assault.
D.

Contract and Tortious Interference Cases

Several cases have contained claims based on contractual rights
under second-tier agreements. Like the cases utilizing due process theories, these claims arise in all four categories of cases, but unlike the

138. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. at 303.
139. The Supreme Court, in Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
stated that "[t]he NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports." 468 U.S. at 117. The Justice court stated that "[tlhe
protection and fostering of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics is a legitimate objective of the NCAA." Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 371. The Hawkins court reached its
conclusion on the legitimacy of amateur intercollegiate athletics on mere involvement
of universities. "Based upon the sheer number of institutions which are active members

of the NCAA, it is obvious that intercollegiate athletics is regarded as an important
adjunct to the academic curriculum." Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at 614-15 (emphasis in
original).
140. Id. at 615.
141. Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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cases raising antitrust, due process or equal protection claims, these
claims sdek to protect the integrity of second-tier agreements. In the
contract-based cases, the student athletes wanted the university, and in
many cases, the governing association, to honor terms the student athletes believed the university had agreed to. These contract-based claims
usually arose in actions for breach of contract and tortious interference
with contractual rights. In the breach of contract cases, the student
athletes asked the courts to enforce the terms of the second-tier agreement. In the tortious interference cases, the student athletes sought to
prevent the implementation of first-tier agreement provisions when implementation would infringe upon their participatory rights under second-tier agreements. At the heart of these cases were the scope and
character of the relationship among the student athlete, the university,
and the governing association.
Those courts that have considered the matter have accepted the
characterization of the second-tier relationship between the university
and the student athlete as contractual.1 42 Contract terms in those cases
were ascertained pursuant to traditional contract law principles. In
Taylor v. Wake Forest University, 4 3 a student athlete sought reimbursement for tuition and expenses after his scholarship was terminated. The court concluded without explanation that the scholarship or
grant-in-aid was a contract, yet found in favor of the university based
on its interpretation of the contract terms found in the written scholarship document.
Classification of the relationship between the student athlete and
the university as contractual only begins to clarify matters, just as an
individual's name only begins to reveal the person. Any number of issues remain, not the least of which is the role of the governing associations and first-tier agreements. The courts have tried to resolve these
issues by ascertaining through traditional contract principles what the
university and the student athlete mutually agreed that role would be.
In Begley v. Corporationof Mercer,"' a Formation case, the university
refused to honor its scholarship award when it discovered that the student athlete was not eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics
under NCAA rules. The student athlete sued the university for breach
of contract and sought recovery of the scholarship, but not
participation.
The court analyzed the issue in terms of whether the university
had assumed the risk that the NCAA would refuse to associate with
the student athlete. To find the answer to that question, the court examined the Student Aid contract where it found a provision under

142.
143.
144.

See supra note 4.
191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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which the student athlete agreed to abide by all the rules and regulations of the NCAA." 6 It concluded that the university had not assumed the risk because the inclusion of that clause implied that both
the student athlete and the 1university
understood that he must meet
6
NCAA academic standards.
The true significance of Begley lies not in the allocation of risk
analysis, but in what it tells us about the relationship between the student and the university and the relationship between the student and
the governing association. First, evidence was adduced by the student
athlete suggesting that the full understanding of the student and the
university regarding their second-tier relationship was not contained in
the Student Aid contract and that the parol portion of the agreement
contravened the written portion on the allocation of risk issue. This
proposition is a familiar refrain in the tortious interference cases in
which the student athlete maintains that the governing association has
interfered with university promises to provide television exposure, appearances in post-season competition, and enhanced opportunities for
professional earnings.
Second, the result indicates that -when the written terms of the
second-tier agreement incorporate the rules and regulations of a governing association -

the normative case -

any second-tier agreement

provisions, whether in writing or otherwise, that contravene the firsttier terms are unenforceable. This outcome is supported with more authority in Walters v. Fullwood.1 What is disturbing about this notion
of the supremacy of first-tier provisions is that standard university
recruiting practices typically involve numerous official and unofficial
personal contacts between the student athlete and university representatives.' 4 9 If the university can not be liable for breach of contract no
matter what its representatives promise or imply, then accountability
must fail since the university is thus free to make or exaggerate its
position without obligation and has little incentive to supervise such
representations.
Any legal doctrine that voids contracts or agreements contrary to
first-tier agreements, however, necessarily fails to distinguish between
the power to act and the legal right to act. 50 First-tier agreements may
145.

Id. at 909.

146.
147.

Id. at 910.
Id. at 909.

148. 675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
149. That these contacts occur is acknowledged by the NCAA in that it devotes
an entire article of its Bylaws to recruiting. NCAA Bylaws art. 13.
150. See Collins v. Lewis, 283 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (discussing the distinction between the legal right as opposed to the power to dissolve a partnership). A fair reading of Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. at 160-61, indicates a
judicial inclination to treat first-tier agreements as abrogating the capacity or power of
universities to breach first-tier agreements.
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negate the legal right of a university to reach contrary second-tier
agreements but not its power to do so, or its liability to student athletes. In many instances, it is entirely possible to hold the university in
breach of both sets of agreements. It is this distinction that the student
athlete brings to bear in the tortious interference cases. For example,
the student athletes in Hawkins argued that the imposition of sanctions
by the NCAA, pursuant to first-tier agreements, constituted tortious
interference with their second-tier agreements. 151 The claim is usually
disposed of, as it was in Hawkins, without an in-depth discussion, probably because the inclusion of the incorporation clause in second-tier
agreements precludes the NCAA or other governing association enforcement action from characterization as wrongful intervention in the
legal sense.
A failure of accountability will occur whenever a university makes
promises that are not enforceable for any reason. A key question then
becomes, "Do universities make such promises?" The circumstances
under which universities normally recruit student athletes alone are
sufficient to create a reasonable inference that universities either make
explicit promises or at least create implicit expectations not reduced to
writing. A deeper inquiry into second-tier relationships reflects a significant class of unmemorialized promises that necessarily must be made
to student athletes, most in accordance with first-tier agreements.
What are those promises? To answer this question, I consider a
question raised earlier: Why do student athletes desire to participate in
intercollegiate athletics when they are so obviously exploited? This,
though, is not the appropriate question. The better question is, why do
they choose to associate with one university rather than another? The
answer is that the student athlete chooses University A over University
B because he perceives that he will be better off at University A. How
does the student reach that perception? He is recruited by each university for its athletic program. In the recruitment process, each university
attempts to induce the student athlete by convincing him that the value
of participation at its university 15will
be greater than the value of partic2
ipation at any other university.
How can either university demonstrate this proposition if it is limited to offering a scholarship that is equivalent to that offered.by any
other university? 6 3 It makes promises and representations or otherwise
151.

Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at 605. The Hawkins court declined to resolve the

iortious interference issue.
152. This proposition flows from the economic maxims that people enter into voluntary exchanges because they expect to gain from the transaction, and that people
seek to maximize their gains in exchanges.
153. The NCAA scholarship policy is properly characterized as a voucher system. The amount of aid that a university is limited to is based upon a formula prescribed in NCAA Bylaws. NCAA Bylaws art. 15.01.7 states:
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creates expectations in the student athlete. These include, but are not

limited to, the quality of its academic program, the quality of its athletic program, the prospect of television exposure and post-season competition, a higher probability of playing at the professional level, the
amount of playing time, national publicity, the specific coaching staff,

post-graduation employment, and last but not least, pecuniary remuneration."" With the possible exception of the quality of the academic
and athletic programs typically described in the university catalogues

or brochures, none of these items are usually included as terms in any
of the written documents executed by or presented to the student ath-

lete. When any of these promises are contained in writing, the language
will probably reflect a general description of the program rather than

an explicit promise to provide a program of that caliber to the student
athlete or any other student.
Finally, even though monetary inducements violate NCAA rules,
that does not mean they are not used. 5 5 Although student athletes will

value items differently, it is undeniable that the university must create
a set of expectations regarding that which the student athlete will re-

ceive from the university to distinguish it from all other universities
competing for that student athlete.
IV.

THE DEFECTS IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF LEGAL RIGHTS

The preceding section may be summarized as follows: Student athletes bring legal actions to challenge two principal defects in the relationships among student athletes, their universities, and governing associations resulting from the assignment of legal rights among them.
An institution shall not award financial aid to a student-athlete that
exceeds the cost of attendance that normally is incurred by students enrolled
in a comparable program at that institution or that exceeds the limitations
established by the membership division of the institution the student athlete
attends, whichever is less. Any financial aid permitted by a division that
would result in a student athlete's total financial aid exceeding the value of
tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books shall be
based upon the demonstrated financial need of the individual studentathlete.
The student athlete, in general, must use this financial aid to purchase the items
specified above from the university at which he participates in intercollegiate athletics.
He is not permitted to participate at one university and matriculate at another. Consequently, even though monetary amounts may vary, the award of financial aid is really a
nontransferable voucher.
154. See McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 119, at 380-81. The authors argue
that scholarships do not constitute the totality of compensation received by the student
athlete. Instead, they argue, the full value of the compensation received equals the
expected value of the collaborative relationship to the student athlete, including enhancements to the probability of realizing professional earnings.
155. 1 in 3 Pro Football Players in Survey Took Payments While in College,
The Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov. 29, 1989, at A43, col. 2.
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They use due process, equal protection, and antitrust laws to influence
the substantive terms of first-tier provisions and they use contractbased actions to hold universities accountable for second-tier promises
in spite of first-tier agreements. Professor Weistart refers to the lack of
influence on substantive terms and lack of accountability for secondtier promises as "structural deficiencies."'' 6 It seems clear that the litigation by student athletes constitutes an effort to correct these structural deficiencies by bargaining over first-tier provisions and university
accountability after the formation of second-tier agreements.
This section of the Article demonstrates that the optimum assignment of legal rights between student athletes and universities is not
obtainable in intercollegiate athletics through bargaining because
transaction costs preclude such bargaining in the formation stage of
second-tier relationships. Instead, such bargaining does not occur until
student athletes embark on a course of litigation when their eligibility
or right to participate in intercollegiate athletics is in jeopardy. This
section will attempt to explain how transaction costs constrain bargaining during formation but less so when eligibility is threatened. This
section will conclude with an argument that the contemporary regulation of intercollegiate athletics is inefficient.
A.

Impact of Transaction Costs at Formation

The courts, as exemplified by the Supreme Court in NCAA v.
Tarkanian,' 7 presuppose that individuals and universities who associate together to produce, sell and deliver intercollegiate athletics will
promote and protect their best interests through bargaining for desired
terms. If they are unable to obtain terms they want, they will protect
themselves by refusing to contract. But the reality is the opposite of
what the courts presuppose. The right to refuse to contract or associate
is illusory in intercollegiate athletics insofar as the student athlete is
concerned. Student athletes are frequently among a group that the law
has historically maintained cannot protect themselves through voluntary contract.
Most student athletes begin their participation and make their
agreements with the university when they are not more than eighteen
years old, a time when the laws of most states consider them minors."
That parents or legal guardians are required to sign letters of intent
156.
157.

Weistart, supra note 5, at 169-71.
109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).

158.

At common law, the capacity of minors, that is persons under the age of 21,

was questionable. Accordingly, contracts entered into by minors are generally voidable.

J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, 1135-44 (2nd ed. 1985). The age
of majority in many states is now 18 but this fact does not change the analysis. Student
athletes are usually recruited and the second-tier relationship is entered into before
they reach their eighteenth birthday.
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and scholarship documents does not rectify the problem. Neither the
student nor his parents are usually represented by an attorney to explain the nature, terms, and legal effects of these agreements. Furthermore, the introduction of attorneys at this stage increases transaction
costs that the student athlete or his family may not be able to afford. "
The legal regime governing the relationship between the student athlete
and the university should recognize that the student athlete and those
acting in his behalf may not do a good job of bargaining for his best
interests.
From the university's perspective, the transaction costs of bargaining with each individual student over every term would render the production of intercollegiate athletic competitions impossible. For example, each student athlete may prefer a different coach, color uniform,
practice times, competing teams, rules, and so forth. Some bargaining
over second-tier agreement terms does occur, more so over the parol
portions of the agreement, and only over terms that do not render production of the product unfeasible. In addition, the student athlete and
the university do not bargain over the incorporation clause.
Transaction costs also motivate students not to exercise their right
to refuse to associate if the university will not separately bargain over
the incorporation clause. Students lack information about the future
and have great difficulty evaluating the right to participate offered by
the university. Moreover, no student has the leverage to force a university to negotiate individually. On the other hand, collective action
would only add virtually prohibitive transaction costs for incoming
freshmen. After all, how would one find out who all the other potential
freshmen are and how much would it cost in time and money to communicate with them? Moreover, who would bear the initial outlays to
organize such collective action?
B.

Impact of Transactions Costs When Eligibility is Threatened

Transaction costs do not vanish when the eligibility of student athletes is threatened. Because of the nature of the exchange between student athletes and universities, if an "exchange" is an appropriate characterization, the perceived value of participation differs once a student
athlete enters the system.1 60 Student athletes, like all college students,
159. Moreover, a student athlete runs the risk of violating NCAA rules if he
does hire an attorney to represent him in bargaining with universities at this stage.
NCAA Bylaws art. 12.3.3.
160. Perhaps, the relationship between a university and its student may be better
characterized as purely "associational." In some sense, a university merely provides an
environment in which a student may obtain an education. Just what the student receives is a function of what the student does and what is available in the environment.
But the university guarantees nothing more than that the student may associate with
others in that environment. It does not promise him that education received will have
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are asked to choose a college based on intangible factors, but no university can guarantee as a practical matter that these factors will be
greater than those offered by some other university. Some terms are
open ended. The relative value of an intangible item may differ with
each student and each factor is incapable of precise assessment at the
time the student makes the choice.161 Who knows whether Harvard really offers a better education than Yale?
Essentially, a student who is not an athlete comes to college to
enhance his own knowledge. He may expect that his attendance at University A will place him in line to receive higher future earnings than
he would receive at University B. However, those future earnings will
not inure solely because he attended University A. The higher earnings
would not materialize if he decided to do nothing after graduation. He
must exert efforts in the future to produce wealth. He does, however,
expect that his matriculation at a particular university will open the
door to a career that will yield a higher level of income than he might
otherwise have received.
These same concerns confront the student athlete when choosing a
university. His ability to assess the amount of value offered to him may
be no better than any other student, but whatever economic value he is
to receive will come to him by virtue of his right to participate in intercollegiate athletics.' 62
The value of the right to participate does not remain constant over
time. Such value increases due to the enhancement of the career income stream available to student athletes as a result of his athletic
training and his education at the particular university. In almost every
case, the student athlete complains only of the loss of the higher income level that he expected to derive from athletics. This limited complaint evidences the perceived value of the student athlete's participation in athletics relative to the value of the education received by the
student athlete. Student athletes may perceive that enhanced career income levels attributable to education may not be available because of
the type of education he is receiving at the particular university.' 63 Or
any particular value, although a student may desire to associate in a specific university
environment because he anticipates that the education received will be valuable. The
actual value of what the student receives, however, depends on what the student does.
161. Items such as the coaching staff and location do not fall into this category,
even though keeping the promises of either might greatly inconvenience
decisionmaking.
162. Even educational benefits are derived from the right to participate. The typical second-tier agreement conditions educational benefits on participation in intercollegiate athletics. See Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App.
1972).
163. He may not be a good student, or academic support programs at the university may be inadequate. In any event, the student athlete may rightly perceive that he
will not be able to cash in on his education after his eligibility expires or he graduates.
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it may be that the career income level he expects to attain as a result of
his education is simply not viewed as a function of his participation in
intercollegiate athletics. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, to the
student athlete, the expectancy in professional earnings constitutes the
principal component of the perceived value of the right to
participate.'
The value of the second-tier relationship to the student athlete,
when viewed in this light, begins to resemble that of the pension rights
of an employee who will vest in a pension plan only after serving for a
specified number of years. Prior to the passage of the vesting term, the
employee has only an inchoate expectancy. From a technical standpoint, the value of the expectancy prior to the vesting of his legal right
is zero. Upon vesting, however, the value dramatically and substantially
increases. For the typical student athlete, who is not likely to have a
professional career, the realization of the economic value occurs in a
similar fashion. He virtually must participate in intercollegiate athletics
for a lengthy period. His chances of a professional career are enhanced
only after extended training and participation.
But for the rare student athlete who is likely to have a professional
career, the economic value of his participation begins to increase substantially as soon as his skill has developed to the point at which he can
be signed by a professional team if he desires. The economic value of
his participation then continues to grow for the duration of his participation. In many instances, the economic value of his participation will
exceed the economic value resulting from his college education due to
anticipated professional earnings. Nevertheless, most of the cases appear to have been brought by the typical student athlete. Professional
caliber student athletes probably do not litigate declarations of ineligibility as often because the different value curve allows them to realize
an enhanced value by entering the professional ranks irrespective of
16 5
team or individual sanctions.
The irony in all this is that student athletes expect to receive value
from the professional earnings component while universities expect
them to receive value from the educational component. This irony is
compounded by the fact that student athletes are often correct in as164. See McKenzie & Sullivan, supra note 118, at 381. But cf. Banks v. NCAA,
746 F. Supp. at 859 in which the court refused to acknowledge the professional earnings expectancy as a component of value. However, the court may have done so because the student athlete concentrated on the value of the grant-in-aid rather than on
the right to participate.
165. Most professional sports leagues will accept student athletes before their
eligibility expires. In fact, the refusal to accept a student athlete at such time has been
held to violate federal antitrust laws. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Ca. 1971). However, some student athletes may erroneously
view themselves as professional caliber athletes. See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp.
738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
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sessing the relative value of the two components to themselves. Considering that universities merely provide students with an opportunity for
an education with the value of that opportunity dependent upon the
capabilities and actions of the students themselves, a university that
views itself as compensating a student athlete with the educational
component is really only providing a form of lottery ticket to the student athlete. Unless a university does something more to make the receipt of an education a reality, whether the student athlete actually
receives one becomes a quirk of fate.
The realization of value curves for colleges and universities are almost the exact opposite. Universities do not wait for student athletes to
graduate to realize economic value. Universities receive pecuniary benefits contemporaneously with the participation of student athletes. The
value the university receives after a student athlete graduates or forfeits his eligibility decreases almost immediately to zero. This consequence explains why universities are willing to litigate on behalf of student athletes who have been disqualified from athletic participation.
On the other hand, student athletes are willing to litigate when
eligibility is threatened because all opportunity to realize the value that
they expect to receive from the professional expectancy will be lost. It
is no coincidence that most of the cases involve sports for which professional careers exist. Student athletes litigate when television and postseason appearances are banned because they perceive, with some justification, that the value of the professional expectancy is a function of
those items. Is it not true that a star athlete at a prestigious university
with a major athletic program has a better chance of winning the Heisman Trophy than a star athlete at a less prestigious university? In fact,
a student athlete who has a choice between those schools may choose
the more prestigious university because of that higher expected value.
In any event, the student athletes who litigate must perceive that the
value which will be lost is greater than the cost of proceeding with the
litigation. Moreover, their loss will include their investment in that expectancy. It would not be reasonable to expect student athletes to simply treat the loss as another of life's experiences.
C.

The Resulting Inefficient Industry

I

The occurrence of structural deficiencies should not surprise anyone because they result from a deliberate assignment of the right to
control the allocation of essential resources to universities. The assignment of legal rights may be unfair to student athletes adversely affected by them and many have so argued. But perhaps the most severe
defects lie in the removal of student athletes as a force capable of balancing the discretion of universities and compelling the universities to
pay the full cost of the activity of intercollegiate athletics.
Courts have acknowledged that inefficiencies occur in amateur in-
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tercollegiate athletics, but they are of the opinion that the benefits of
amateurism to society clearly outweigh the inefficiencies. 66 As indicated elsewhere in this Article, the courts seem to take judicial notice
of this proposition without requiring evidentiary proof. 6 ' Judicial attitudes thus not only reflect the notion that universities are better repositories of the control of resources in intercollegiate athletics, they also
reflect a sense that student athletes generally are not suitable repositories. In acting on these attitudes, courts lose sight of the need for balance in the control of the allocation of resources. Without checks on
those who have been assigned the right to control, activities will not
necessarily bear the costs they engender' 6 8 and resources will not be
efficiently allocated. As shown in Part II, universities do not have a
legal obligation to pay the costs of the compensation promised to student athletes and student athletes are unable to obtain accountability
for such items through bargaining during the formation stage. Without
a legal obligation to pay them, universities in many instances do not.
Economic theory predicts that universities acting to further their selfinterest will exploit this circumstance. Consequently, young people
lured by the prospect of success in the industry of athletics choose to
develop their athletic skills over their academic and job skills.
The logical end of a system that assigns the control of resources to
universities and gives student athletes few enforceable legal rights is
nothing short of scandalous. Illiterate student athletes graduating without a degree or an education and unprepared for life after sports
greatly outnumber the rare professional athlete with a million dollar
income. I do not mean to suggest that amateurism is inherently bad or
that amateurism as conceived under the three pronged policy of the
NCAA should never have been tried. But the system needs changes.
The current form of intercollegiate athletics evolved from a system established by people motivated to help student athletes. Yet, the contemporary version would have evolved differently if universities and the
courts had empowered the student athletes to assist in providing for
their own protection.
V.

THE SOLUTION: A COMMON LAW OR CODE OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

In the preceding pages, I have argued that the system which produces, sells, and delivers intercollegiate athletics is inefficient. This
inefficiency is due in large part to the assignment of legal rights among
student athletes and universities. A logical path to improve efficiency is
166. See supra note 137.
167.

Id.

See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
168.
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clearly reassigtlment of these legal rights. Legal rights should be reassigned so that the intercollegiate athletics industry does not lose the
counter-balance of self-interested student athletes. This new assignment of rights should be accomplished by restricting universities' right
to refuse to associate and by limiting the range of permissible terms
and conditions to which the parties may agree when they choose to
associate, or which otherwise flow through associational law. In this
section, I will suggest the substance of possible restrictions and the
methods by which their imposition may be effected. An appropriate regime may be created through the promulgation of a uniform code of
intercollegiate athletics enacted by Congress or state legislatures or
through the development of common law rules recognizing the unique
relationship among student athletes, universities, and governing
associations.
A code of intercollegiate athletics would function as a device, similar to state corporation codes, capable of reducing the high transaction
costs of bargaining among student athletes, universities, and governing
associations.169 Promulgation of a code offers several advantages, including a wider range of solutions, and the checks and balances of the
political process. But the principal advantage is uniformity. The interstate nature of intercollegiate athletics and the need for uniformity suggest that congressional promulgation is preferable. However, uniformity could be obtained through a uniform code adopted by states in the
manner of the Uniform Commercial Code and other uniform statutes.
Recognition of a common law relationship among the collaborators
engaged in the production and delivery of intercollegiate athletics and a
related set of rules to govern these relationships would also substitute
for more costly and inefficient bargaining. Such an approach would be
similar to the way fiduciary principles govern the relationship between
fiduciaries and beneficiaries. 17 0 A common law approach requires continued litigation and its results may be less uniform than the statutory
approach. The common law approach, however, does allow the rules to
develop gradually whereas the statutory approach will require guessing.
A. A Code of Intercollegiate Athletics
Congress recently enacted the Student-Athlete's Right to Know
Act,17 1 which requires universities to disclose their graduation rates to
prospective student athletes. Such laudable and welcome steps constitute only a beginning.
169. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints,
91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982).
170. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 754 (1978).
171.

Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2381 (1990).

1990]

INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

The purpose of the Act is to enhance the ability of student athletes
to ascertain the value of the consideration offered by a university, based
solely on the educational component, in exchange for his services. It
does not address the valuation of prospective professional earnings,
which is the primary attraction to many student athletes. 172 Consequently, the right to disclosure of graduation rates alone will not rectify
structural deficiencies and industry inefficiency; other rights are
needed. The right of universities to refuse to associate ought to be restricted by limiting the right of universities to define and enforce amateurism, and by conferring specific substantive rights on student athletes with respect to the educational obligations of universities.
1. Amateurism and Its Enforcement
Any meaningful code of intercollegiate athletics must address amateurism. Framers of a code must decide whether to prohibit amateurism through first-tier agreements or to simply regulate its imposition.
Choosing the former would allow an individual university to restrict its
association with student athletes by limiting compensation to specific
items without regard to other universities' policies. More important, little more would be required in such a code as market discipline would
remedy many of the problems described in this Article, including structural deficiencies. But I question whether universities and legislatures
are ready to toss aside in one broad stroke the brand of amateur interso revered by the Supreme Court173 and the rest of
collegiate athletics
17 4
the judiciary.
Accordingly, I suggest a code of intercollegiate athletics that accepts amateurism, but regulates it. I am mindful that altering the status quo will result in a different evolutionary pathway and may lead to
the eventual extinction of amateur intercollegiate athletics, at least as
it is now known.
A code of intercollegiate athletics that regulates amateurism could
draw upon the many cases that touch and concern amateurism and the
enforcement powers of governing associations. Student athletes have
specifically sought the following through the courts: a broader definition of amateurism, abolition of the maximum penalty of permanent
ineligibility for any violation of amateurism, 71 a greater role in eligibility hearings and in the imposition of institutional sanctions, the aboli172. A recent study conducted by the NCAA showed that 44% of black football
and basketball players expected to become professional athletes. Many Black College
Athletes Express Feelings of Isolation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
173. See, e.g., Tarkanian, 109 S.Ct. at 454.
174. See supra note 137.
175. Violations of amateurism are not the only actions that may trigger loss of
eligibility, nor is loss of eligibility permanent in all cases. See NCAA Bylaws art. 14.
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tion of uniform minimum academic standards, and a less inclusive
transfer rule. I will discuss each of these below.
a. Definition of Amateurism
The first two prongs of the NCAA's amateurism policy 176 consti-

tute the core of the definition of amateurism at the collegiate level.
Universities may not compensate student athletes for athletic skill except as permitted, and student athletes may not receive compensation
for athletic skill from any source. Some of the litigation brought by
student athletes, as well as some violations of NCAA rules by student
athletes, is motivated by resentment against the fundamental concept
in the first prong that focuses on the compensation received by the athletes but not on compensation of other collaborators. The dicta in judicial opinions expressing reverence for amateurism justifies this definition on the basis of the academic mission of the participating
universities. However, this pristine view overlooks a fundamental distinction between intercollegiate athletics, at least where "revenue producing" sports are concerned, and the normal academic programs of
universities. Universities ordinarily do not sell the academic product of
its students. Amateurism exists at the collegiate level in large part because it is viewed as an academic program and students ordinarily are
not awarded academic credit and pecuniary compensation for the same
work. When a university does sell an academic product, such as the
licensing of a patent, the students and professors involved normally
share directly in the economic rewards. Amateurism is an aberration in
this respect.
Although violations and litigation may be spurred by resentment,
student athletes have not directly challenged this asymmetrical definition in the cases. Instead, they have sought to broaden the scope of the
first and second prongs of the NCAA's concept of amateurism to include athletes who receive value under circumstances that the NCAA
now construes as the impermissible receipt of compensation in exchange for athletic skill. This is a plausible interpretation of the stakes
and motivations in Gillard v. NCAA1 77 and Regents of the University
of Minnesota.1 8 In Gillard, a student athlete lost some eligibility because he purchased a suit of clothes at a discount, whereas in Regents
of the University of Minnesota student athletes were deemed professionals because coaches furnished them transportation to and from a
summer camp or because they sold complimentary tickets at a modest
profit. Many provocative questions have not been litigated. For example, should a student athlete who has been randomly selected at a bas176.
177.
178.

See supra text accompanying notes 106-18.
352 So.2d 1072 (Miss. 1977).
560 F.2d at 352.
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ketball game be deemed a professional because he wins a prize for
making a shot from halfcourt?
The NCAA definition of compensation in exchange for athletic
skill narrows too greatly the characteristics of those whom it considers
to be amateurs. Internal pressures within the NCAA have produced
some changes over the years, such as the NCAA rule that an athlete
can be a professional in one sport but an amateur in another. 179 Nevertheless, the rules remain cumbersome, inconsistent, and unnecessarily
restrictive.
A code of intercollegiate athletics could address both the resentment and the underinclusiveness of the definition of amateurism. It
need not abolish amateurism but it should disavow the broad brush
approach of the NCAA and broaden the scope of the amateur
characterization.
b. Abolition of Automatic Permanent Ineligibility
Closely related to concerns about the scope of amateurism are the
penalties for its violations. A major concern of the university tribunal
in NCAA v. Regents of the University of Minnesota was the
mandatory penalty of permanent ineligibility for minor infractions of
amateurism. The NCAA does not disagree that minor violations should
not receive the ultimate penalty but uses an "Alice in Wonderland"
approach; first it sentences, then it holds a hearing to determine if the
sentence should be reduced. The purpose of this approach is to deter
universities from willful violations. If a university must constantly fear
the imposition of the maximum penalty, it reduces the temptation to
cut corners. Yet this approach means that neither the university nor
student athletes know what the real penalties will be for a violation and
there is no guarantee that like offenses will receive like treatment.
A code of intercollegiate athletics should replace this system with
one that reverses the present approach. It should establish a system in
which offenses and penalties are established in advance rather than on
an ad hoc basis 80° and penalties are proportionate to offenses.
c. Greater Role in the Process
As a general rule of law, only the members of governing associations are entitled to take part in the decisional processes of governing
associations. In response to litigation over the exclusion of student athletes from the hearing process when eligibility is at stake, NCAA rules
now permit student athletes to participate in the appeals process to restore eligibility.' Student athletes remain excluded from the process
179. NCAA Bylaws art. 12.
180. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 560 F.2d at 369.

181. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.14.2. Of course, this participation can occur only if
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when sanctions are imposed on a member university for violations.
They have no right to receive notice of charges against a university or
to appeal internally a decision to impose sanctions on a university even
though they will bear a significant brunt of the sanctions. Although
student athletes have not litigated the point, they also have no right to
take part in the rule making process even when the proposed rule directly affects them as in Propositions 48182 and 42.183 Recently, however, the NCAA has established an advisory committee of student athletes to voice opinions on new rules. 8
A code of intercollegiate athletics should require that student athletes have a greater role in the processes of governing associations when
decisions will be made directly affecting student athletes. They should
have a right, independent of the university, to appeal their loss of eligibility. Student athletes should be allowed to participate in hearings to
appeal sanctions against their university even if it is only to plead for
leniency.1 85 Moreover, they should have the right to appeal sanctions if
the university chooses not to do so. Such a right would be similar to a
shareholder's right to bring derivative actions. Finally, student athletes
ought to have a formal role in rulemaking decisions that affect student
athletes. They should be permitted to present their positions on proposed rules prior to adoption.
d.

Uniform Minimum Academic Standards

A student athlete has unfettered discretion in deciding whether to
associate with a university. A university has broad discretion in deciding whether to associate with a student athlete. In general, student athletes should expect that a university may use that discretion to refuse
to associate with student athletes based upon their prior academic and
athletic performance. The choice of academic standards is usually a
prerogative of the autonomy of a university. Thus, a student athlete
may be acceptable to one university but not acceptable to another.
Uniform minimum academic standards infringe upon this autonomy. There is only one plausible justification for an infringement on
the academic autonomy of universities when intercollegiate athletics
are concerned but not in other academic programs: that is the elimination of competitive advantages on the playing field for universities willing to admit gifted student athletes who have dubious academic potential under uniform criteria relative to universities that will not.
the university decides to appeal.
182. Now codified at NCAA Bylaws art. 14.3.
183. Codified at NCAA Bylaws art. 14.3.2, repealed and replaced effective Aug.
1, 1990, by Proposition 26 codified at NCAA Bylaws arts. 14.3.2.1 through 14.3.2.2.
184. NCAA Bylaws art. 21.3.23.
185. Such a provision would overrule the holdings in Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. at
602 and Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 356.
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Proponents of uniform standards argue that such standards are
necessary to prevent the exploitation of minority student athletes,
thereby acknowledging that the issue of uniformity has principal meaning only to minority student athletes. They overlook the significance of
university autonomy in fulfilling the aspirations of minority students to
obtain a college education. It is noteworthy that the principal culprit in
Parish v. NCAA was the governing association and its uniform standard rather than the university. University autonomy is not only desirable in the area of minority access to higher education, it is essential.
Given the differences in performance under most standardized criteria
along racial lines, universities necessarily must take a closer look at
minority applicants, and this can not be done under rigid adherence to
uniform standards. A university must have a free hand in setting the
range of credentials acceptable to it if it is to provide access for larger
numbers of minority applicants, including student athletes.
No university can determine at the outset which of these students
with credentials that deviate from the norm will succeed; it can only
know that some of them will. The question ought not to be whether
universities can admit such students. If a university wants to devote
resources and bear the costs of saving a handful, why prevent it from
doing so? Rather than subject universities to a uniform academic standard, a code of intercollegiate athletics should focus on the programs
available to a student athlete once he matriculates, not on the admissions process.
e.

Less Inclusive Transfer Rule

The articulated purpose for rules discouraging, transfers between
universities is to prevent raiding by competing universities. The fear is
that unrestrained transfers could transform intercollegiate athletics into
professional sports through continuous bidding for the services of student athletes after they enter the system.
Cases upholding transfer restrictions and other rules at the collegiate level often rely on precedents from high school cases. 8 Reliance on high school cases fails to consider the role of choice at the
collegiate level. Student athletes choose to attend specific colleges and
participate in their athletic programs. In making this choice, they are
forced to place a value on what they stand to gain from each university.
The nature and timing of this valuation process is such that any particular value will frequently be speculative. Student athletes, just like any
other students, may choose to transfer when they realize that they
made an error in valuation, and that the university is not living up to
expectations.
A blanket transfer rule imposes additional costs on a student ath186.

See Parish, 506 F.2d at 1034; Gillard, 352 So.2d at 1081.
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lete for making an error in his original Valuation. He may desire to
transfer because of personality clashes with a coach or teammates,
homesickness, dissatisfaction with the academic program, or disappointment in playing time. Not every student athlete desires to transfer
because of improper inducements. In fact, the reported cases involve
transfers for other reasons.
A code of intercollegiate athletics should seek to balance the concerns relating to the disruption of the athletic programs of universities
with legitimate attempts on the part of student athletes to correct erroneous valuation decisions. Student athletes who desire to transfer for
reasons other than improper inducements ought to be able to transfer
without additional costs. Perhaps every student athlete should be entitled to transfer at least once without penalty. Or perhaps governing
associations should establish an arbitrational system pursuant to which
a student athlete could petition a tribunal who would determine if it is
a legitimate transfer request. If so, the student athlete could transfer
without penalty.
2.

Substantive Right to an Education

Student athletes should pursue the obligation of universities to
provide an education. A student author once proposed a contractual
obligation on the part of universities to educate their students. 187 The
difficulty of imposing specific substantive obligations lies in the elusive
nature of education. Its value depends on many factors, including the
academic preparation and motivation of individual student. Difficulty
in attaining academic success should not be confused with impossibility, however.
As matters now stand, the university is obligated only to provide
an opportunity to receive an education. As I have suggested elsewhere
in this Article, the promise to provide this opportunity resembles a lottery ticket. The opportunity would have more substance if the university were required to do more than merely let student athletes enroll
and take courses.
A code of intercollegiate athletics could add substance by requiring the university to make a four year commitment to the student on
the education side. Under current NCAA rules, a university may offer
an athletic scholarship for a maximum period of one year at a time,18 8
but the opportunity for an education bestowed upon a student athlete
in one year has relatively little value. If a university chooses not to
renew a scholarship for a student athlete, it has compensated him with
187. Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract
Theory, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 96 (1985); see also Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp.
1319 (N.D. Il1. 1990).
188. NCAA Bylaws art. 15.3.3.
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a losing lottery ticket. In order for the opportunity to receive an education to have meaning, the normal obligation of a university ought to
extend for at least as long asA it normally takes a student athlete to'
obtain his degree.
A code of intercollegiate athletics should extend the obligation of
universities, and in addition to lengthening the period of commitment,
it should require minimum levels of support programs. It is unrealistic
to expect that student athletes can take full advantage of the opportunity to obtain an education without assistance. The necessity for academic support increases as a university admits student athletes with
academic credentials substantially deviating from those of its typical
students. Imposing a more substantive obligation to provide an education does not mean that universities should guarantee a degree. It simply means that the university will be required to take specific measures
to enhance the likelihood that a student athlete receives one. Such results would also be relevant in evaluating academic enhancement programs used by universities.
B.

A Common Law of Intercollegiate Athletics

Realistically, promulgation of a code may take several years. Seeking relief through the common law provides an alternative evolutionary
pathway that the framers of a code could build upon. The development
of a common law of intercollegiate athletics, although accomplishable,
faces several obstacles. Courts must be asked to cast aside their reverence for intercollegiate amateurism. Uniformity among jurisdictions is
not guaranteed. Solutions crafted through legislative compromise are
not available because of considerations of judicial restraint. A proponent of common law rules must be willing to bear the costs of advocating advances in the law. Finally, its development will depend upon the
serendipitous occasions of actual disputes.
A common law of intercollegiate athletics will have to address two
basic issues. It must define the relationships that are covered and determine the substantive rights based upon those relationships in specific
circumstances. The first issue poses little difficulty. I have devoted substantial space in this Article to the first- and second-tier relationships
among student athletes, universities, and governing associations in connection with the production, sale, and delivery of intercollegiate athletics. Most courts and commentators deem the second-tier relationship
between a student athlete and his university as contractual, but conspicuously have not determined the class of contract. The first-tier relationships creating governing associations are deemed to be matters of
voluntary associations law. Although some light has been shed on firstand second-tier relationships, the relationship between student athletes
and governing associations remains obscured. A common law of intercollegiate athletics must recognize the existence of this relationship and
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allocate rights directly between student athletes and governing
associations.
The second issue is more problematic. The nature of common law
development requires actual cases with concrete circumstances. Some
of the cases and circumstances discussed previously lend themselves to
common law development more so than others. The types of cases best
suited for this approach are perhaps cases involving contract-based issues, Termination cases involving due process issues, cases in any category in which a court may be asked to narrow the scope of amateurism
or provide standards for setting penalties, and Transfer cases in which
the court may be asked to narrow the scope of the blanket rule covering all transfers.
Contract-based cases offer the opportunity to craft the fundamental relationship among student athletes, universities, and governing associations. Student athletes must ask the courts to recognize that the
nature of this tripartite relationship includes formal and informal
agreements, and that universities enter into second-tier relationships
with promises that affect the relationship between student athletes and
governing associations, often in contravention of first-tier agreement
terms. Moreover, student athletes must ask the courts to examine and
give life to the reasonable expectations of the student athlete created by
his university. Recognition of the formal written second-tier agreement
while ignoring the extra-writing informal agreements facilitates frustrating reasonable expectations. It is this familiar contractual concept
of reasonable expectations that makes contract-based cases suitable for
common law development.
Recognition of informal, extra-writing agreements means enforcing agreements for payments that violate NCAA rules. Such enforcement merely accepts that the university and the student athlete retain
the capacity or power to breach their contractual arrangements with
each other and the governing associations. Accepting the notion of contract breach is far more appropriate than branding the student athlete
as a criminal while viewing universities as innocent victims.1 89
The contract-based cases also offer the opportunity to transform
189. Federal prosecutors have begun to use the Racketeering, Influence and
Criminal Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) to reach agents who sign
student athletes before their eligibility has expired and the student athletes who sign
with them. The theory is that the agents and the student athletes defrauded the university when the student athlete continued to participate for the university, knowing that
signing terminated his eligibility under NCAA rules. NCAA Bylaws art. 12.1.1(c). In
the Norby Walters case, the most notorious one to date, the federal prosecutor obtained a conviction for the agent and plea bargains from over 40 of the student athletes
who signed with him. They agreed under the terms of the plea bargain to testify, serve
250 hours of community service, and reimburse their universities for their scholarships.
L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1989, at 3, col. 1. The convictions of Norby Walters and Lloyd
Bloom were reversed and a new trial ordered because of errors at trial.
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the ,promise of an opportunity for an education from a lottery ticket
into a realistic probability of receiving an education. Student athletes
will have to focus on the enhancement of future earnings due to the
educational component of their realization of value curves instead of, or
in addition to, the professional earnings component. Courts may be receptive to a claim grounded on a university's structuring the curriculum of a student athlete with a view toward the maintenance of eligibility rather than meaningful progress toward a degree. Claims based on
the failure to provide tutors or adequate studying time ought to receive
a similar judicial reception. The NCAA requirement that the student
athlete make satisfactory progress toward a degree1 90 should be interpreted as giving the student athlete a substantive right to an environment and program that facilitates his reasonable progress.
One advantage of allocating greater rights to student athletes with
respect to educational promises is that it obviates the need for uniform
minimum academic standards. If a university admits student athletes
whose academic records do not measure up to Proposition 48 standards,
it should have an obligation to provide that student academic support
and monitoring that will help assure his academic progress. If the obligation were made a legally enforceable one, a university would have to
evaluate acceptance of a student athlete against the ability of the university to fulfill its obligation to educate the student athlete.
Termination cases involving due process issues are ripe for a common law approach because the existing cases provide precedential
value. Most courts that have considered due process questions have upheld the procedures in question even when they have determined that
the NCAA is not a state actor. The mere fact that the courts subjected
the procedures to review could form the foundation of a common law
requirement that governing associations and universities must afford
student athletes, who are not members of the governing association or
parties to the first-tier agreements, due process both in termination of
eligibility proceedings and in enforcement proceedings against a university that may result in sanctions adversely affecting student athletes.
The adoption of common law due process requirements, in essence,
would restrict the right of a governing association and its members to
refuse to associate with a student athlete in intercollegiate athletics unless they provide due process to the affected student athlete.
Threats to amateurism have arisen in all four categories of cases.

190. NCAA Bylaws art. 14.01.1 requires that a student athlete enroll on fulltime basis and "maintain satisfactory progress toward a ... degree." As is typical of
many NCAA bylaws, the actual language of the bylaw imposes the obligation to make
satisfactory progress on the student athlete rather than the university. However, the
Principle of Student-Athlete Welfare set forth in NCAA CONST. art. 2.2 states, "Intercollegiate athletic programs shall be conducted in a manner designed to protect and
enhance the physical and educational welfare of student athletes."
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A common law of intercollegiate athletics would broaden the scope of
amateurism on a gradual case-by-case basis to include athletes whose
activities would technically qualify them as professionals under NCAA
rules. The ideal cases will be those that carefully frame the issues on a
specific limit of amateurism. The student athlete must utilize a slice of
the loaf approach that apprises the court of the limited focus of the
challenge and convinces the court that the effect of a favorable ruling
for the student athlete will be gradual change rather than sudden
revolution. In fact, in many instances a student athlete may be able to
demonstrate his request only by asking the court to validate the status
quo, notwithstanding NCAA rules to the contrary."'
Termination cases, perhaps, offer the best opportunity for developing common law restrictions on amateurism as these cases seek the
thinnest slice; the student athlete need only ask for a restriction of the
right of the university and the governing association to refuse to associate with him. A court need only hold that the purchase of clothing at a
discount, the giving of rides, the occasional lending of a car by a coach
or other person, or some similar violation of NCAA rules does not constitute compensation in exchange for athletic skill. Such holdings would
restrict the NCAA from construing all transactions as involving tainted
compensation merely because it is difficult to discern a tainted from an
untainted transaction.
One other advantage is offered by the Termination cases. A student athlete need not ask the court to render a decision touching amateurism at all. He could ask the court to restrict the permissible range
of penalties or at least require the establishment of a system of penalties such that student athletes will have prior notice of the likely penalty for a given violation. Moreover, a student athlete could petition the
court to assure that he will receive a penalty consistent with the penalty
meted out to others who committed the same violation. A court could,
consistent with current NCAA practices, rule that some permanent ineligibility is not a suitable penalty for some classes of violations.
The same logic would apply in the Transfer cases. Cases involving
a student athlete who has transferred because of academic reasons are
the most appealing. Here a court could simply restrict a governing association from penalizing a student who sought to maximize his academic potential. More troublesome are those potentially archetypical
raiding cases in which a student athlete seeks to transfer because of
personal conflicts with the coaching staff or lack of playing time. Nevertheless, a student athlete who is able to demonstrate that his lack of
playing time or a bona fide conflict rises to a level at which the univer-

191. For example, if payments to student athletes in excess of NCAA limits are
the rule rather than the exception, then the student athlete has an argument based on
industry custom. The rule is out of step rather than the payments. See supra note 153.
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sity is no longer meeting his reasonable expectations based on prior
university promises may be successful.
Formation and Nature and Quality cases appear to offer unfavorable milieus for challenging the parameters of amateurism under a slice
of the loaf approach. Universities possess substantial discretion in determining whom they will admit as a student. A successful challenge to
first-tier eligibility rules by a student athlete would not necessarily preclude a university from deciding independently of first-tier obligations
to deny admission. Many Nature and Quality cases would have a major impact on the functioning of governing associations. A suit that successfully challenges the range of sanctions that may be imposed on a
university constitutes a rather large slice of the loaf.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article presents a starting point for the debate over the future of intercollegiate athletics. It does not call for the end of amateurism, only the end of its enshrinement by law. We must determine if
amateurism can exist without express legal protection or we may discover that we have a system that is a dinosaur that refused to evolve. I
suspect that until the aggrieved student athlete has power in the system
of checks and balances in the industry of intercollegiate athletics, the
industry will continue to evolve inefficiently, capable of survival only
through legal subsidization. I propose to save this system with an idea
as old as the law itself; I ask that we provide legal rights to student
athletes, sufficient to enable them to receive adequate consideration for
their efforts, or at least, what they have been promised.

